17th century L plan structure with angle turrets and a circular stair tower in the re-entrant angle. There are unusual twin gables at roof level. 3 storeys high with an attic – the walls are harled and whitewashed. A Georgian two storey and attic wing was added around 1805. In Rob Roy’s day the Laird of Aberuchill still thought it prudent to pay the outlaw “mail” or protection money despite the fact that he was Lord Justice Clerk to ensure his cattle wouldnt be stolen! His son Sir James Campbell stopped paying this protection money and Rob Roy himself arrived at Aberuchill during a dinner party forcing Sir James to pay the traditional premium.

When attempting to provide a narrative of the advent of the Romano-British period, it is necessary to look at the Classical sources, whether or not they can be relied upon. They provide the only written record of events, which were to alter irrevocably, the history, the future of the British Isles. It is the intention of this narrative however, not simply to repeat what is, seemingly accepted by the majority of people, but to bring it up to date, as far as current theories, archaeology, and research will permit.  The Classical sources are without doubt very useful tools, somewhere to start looking for the answers to the questions: what happened, why did events happen as they did, when did they happen, and where did they happen. It is necessary also, to provide the scenario, the backdrop of the Britain upon which, the might of the Roman legions was about to fall, bringing to a close that period called ‘Prehistoric’, ‘Iron-age’, ‘the time of the Barbarians.’ The Classical sources available to the scholar, include, Caesar’s Gallic Wars, the Annals and Histories of Tacitus, Strabo’s Geographica, Cassius Dio, and Suetonius’s biographies, all of which provide aspects, which are relevant here.

Although it is accepted by many that Britain was a Celtic country, that term in it-self, is now considered to be an over generalisation. There were many cultural, religious, artistic and blood links between the peoples of Britain, and the peoples of continental Europe, Gaul in particular. However, each people, each tribe, was a culture unto itself also, each with it’s own distinctive identity. The main arena of the events about to unfold, is the parts of the British Isles, which are now the counties of Kent and East Sussex, on the south coast, and which have the river Thames to their north together with those parts which bordered the northern bank of the Thames. 

Politically, in the 1^st century before Christ, the area along the south coast was an area in turmoil. There had begun, another invasion, during the 1^st century B.C., that of the Belgaei, it was they who became the warlords, the chieftains, the overlords, they stamped their culture on the southern tribes, among them, though to what extent is unclear, were the Cantiaci. They were however, far from the barbarians the Romans reported them as. They did perhaps live a simpler way of life, one more in-tune with the land upon which they lived, more in-tune with the seasons of the year, but as disciplined, in their own way, as the budding Empire of Rome.   

The land was cultivated to a large degree, crops such as emmer and spelt wheat, barley, rye, and oats were harvested, the land was ploughed by an extinct breed of cattle called ‘bos longifrons’. 

Celtic beans (Vicia faba minor) were grown, also ‘Fat Hen’(Chenopodium album); vetch for cattle fodder, and woad (Isatis tinctoria) as a dye plant.  Small ‘Soay’ sheep grazed the uplands, providing meat and wool, pigs too were a major part of their diet, as were the huge herds of cattle.

Their trained hunting dogs were heard of, even in Rome. Horses were bred, but not according to the archaeological record, for draught work, they were, it seems, bred solely for martial activities, such as hunting, and the driving of war chariots, each chariot requiring a team of two horses to pull them. All of this points to a sophisticated society, one capable of efficient husbandry and agriculture. Compared to the populous cities of Rome, the British lived in farmsteads, and small family groups of their round houses, wattle and daub walled with conical thatched roofs, dotted the landscape.

A few more major settlements existed, some tribal ‘capitals’ have been given the title of citvitas, which, after the conquest, were utilised by the Romans as locations for some of their major settlements. The Belgic civitas of the Cantiaci, was, (in Latin) Durovernum Cantiacorum, a name preserved to this day, as Canterbury. Hill-forts, of an earlier period formed their main defences in times of intertribal conflict.

Recent archaeology has discovered much about the life style of pre-Roman Britain, but many questions have still to be answered. Decorative metalwork too shows of British artistic expressionism and ability, works in bronze, iron, and gold, some of enormous richness and craftsmanship have been excavated and discovered.

Across the English Channel, an altogether different opinion of the native Britons was being formulated by Gaius Julius Caesar. He had been heavily engaged battling with the Germanic tribes by the River Rhine, and, by the late summer of 55B.C., he was taking an interest in the mysterious island visible from Gaul. He drew upon the knowledge of traders, (who must have had their own agenda) and in his illuminating work, ‘The Gallic Wars’, he said of the Britons thus : 

caes.gal.5.12 
“The interior portion of Britain is inhabited by those whom they say that is handed down by tradition that they were born in the island itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over from the country of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war; almost all of whom are called by the names of the states from which being sprung they went thither, and having waged war, continued there and began to cultivate the lands. The number of people is countless, and their buildings exceedingly numerous, for the most part very like those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brass or iron rings, determined at a certain weight as their money. Tin is produced in the midlands regions; in the maritime, iron, but the quantity of it is small; they employ brass, which is imported. There, as in Gaul, is timber of every description, except beech and fir. They do not regard it lawful to eat hare, and the cock, and the goose; they, however, breed them for amusement and pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, the cold being less severe.”  

The concept of Belgic migration, be it for ‘plunder and making war’ or other reasons, is not the easiest to grasp. Frere says that it was an ethnic not a tribal title. Their influence spread over much of the south coast, though actual colonisation may have been restricted to the more central parts, from Hampshire, to Wiltshire. It does seem, from Caesar’s writings at least, that the Cantiaci, were a people who were willing to trade, and to some extent embrace the trappings of a rapacious Rome.

caes.gal.5.14, 
“The most civilised of all these nations are those who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the Gallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not grow corn, but live on milk and flesh, and are clad in skins. All the Britons, indeed, dye themselves with woad, which occasions a bluish colour, and thereby have a more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their hair long, and have every part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and even twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers among brothers, and parents among their children, but if they have any issue by these wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whom respectively each was first espoused when a virgin.”  

It has been said that Celtic, Gaulic, British, warriors took the heads of their vanquished enemies, and presented them as trophies, that they took slaves, and sacrificed humans and that that behaviour is evidence of their barbarism. Evidence for the latter certainly exists across the Iron-age Celtic cultures. Bodies have survived, mummified, in peat bogs from Denmark, England, Wales, Germany, Holland and even Scandinavia. This on the face of it seems a terrible fate for anyone to endure, but when such actions are criticised by Romans, who were regaled and entertained by the pseudo-ritualistic slaughter of men killing men, and women killing women, under the title of Gladiatorial Combat, it seems slightly hypocritical. Even today, atrocities of the worst kind are enacted all over the world, by so-called civilised societies. Certainly, life in iron-age Britain was far from easy, and less than secure, but their way of life was their own, it was their identity. It was soon to be lost, forever. Guiding their path’s through the mysteries of life and death were the Druids. Little can be said of these people, their way of life, beliefs, even their appearance. They wrote nothing down, they recorded nothing, everything, every mystery was passed presumably by the telling of stories, time-remembered folk memories. Hated by the Romans in Gaul, hunted, harried and killed when found, many Druids that survived made their way across the water to Britain during the 1^st century B.C. and the 50 years thereafter. Whatever is currently portrayed as being Druidic is a fake, a fabrication, Victorian revival romanticism, nothing more. Their temples were the trees, groves, springs, rivers, ponds, bogs, they needed no monumental marble columns, they had the land its-self.

This then was the Britain, or one vision of it, which existed before the arrival of the Legions, it may seem fanciful, it may seem sanitised, that was not the intention, the intention was to try and use the Romans own chronicles, but to interpret them, and the current archaeological record, into a view of what might have been. What actually was, we may never know for certain.

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

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When James IV ascended the throne of Scotland in 1488, he was 15 years of age and the wily Henry VII was king of the southern neighbour, England.  When Henry died in 1509, he was succeeded by his second son, Henry VIII, who in his youth was a tall, lean and handsome figure of a man. More direct that his father, he was a man of action, a doer rather than a schemer. He left the scheming to his ministers and advisors.

It was not long however before the two nations of England and Scotland were squabbling, rumblings that had continued since before the Norman Conquest, border raids and counter raids by the families of the reivers was part of the enduring history of the border region.

In 1511 France was virtually under siege by an alliance of several states, Henry, seeing a chance to have a go at the old enemy joined the alliance, which completed the encirclement of France. There was though another alliance – The Auld Alliance – between France and Scotland, it was deep-rooted and was to remain so for a considerable time yet to come. This alliance was a constant thorn in the side of the English establishment for generations, constantly making nuisances to the peace of the realm. The fact that Henry was in France, making war upon that nation was an ideal opportunity for James of Scotland to venture south of the border, ostensibly to prevent many of the ‘Border Reivers’ from raiding his lowland territories. Henry, had with him most of his tried and trusted military commanders and soldiery, the few men able to forestall James’ advances into England were seemingly, those less able to command. After much political wrangling, on the 26 July, 1513, James sent his ambassador, Lyon Herald to Henry, who was with his army, encamped near Therouanne, in France. The message basically was that if Henry insisted on warring with France, then he, James, felt duty bound to assist king Louis. Henry’s reply was by the standards of those days, both blunt and to the point “We cannot maruayle, considering the ancient accustomable manners of your progenitors, which neuer kept lenger faythe and promise than pleased them.” He then, quite categorically, informed James that he had no intention of withdrawing his army from France.

Prior to his departure, Henry had appointed the Earl of Surrey as Lord Lieutenant of the North, he was then, 70 years of age. The Scots may have under-estimated the capabilities of such a venerable old man. In the first weeks of August, James assembled his troops near Edinburgh, it was said to be the largest, most well equipped army to leave Scotland until more modern times. They were composed of all three sections of the Scottish people, highlanders, lowlanders, and borderers, a union most uncommon. The total numbers assembled have been exaggerated in many accounts, and the accuracy of numbers can never be certain, though for this purpose, the figure of somewhat less than 30,000 men will be assumed. Included were the flower of Scottish nobility, dukes, lords, earls and clan chiefs. 

Also included was a contingent of French soldiers under the command of Count d’Aussi, their primary function appears to have been the tutelage of modern methods of warfare, including the use of the continental long-handled pike, and the two pieces of ordnance provided to king James. These brought the numbers of Scottish artillery up to seventeen heavy guns, guns, which required over 400 oxen to convey them and their ammunition. They were by far, superior to anything that the English could muster against them. Included in this inventory were ‘courtaulds’ or ‘murtherers’, the largest of James’ guns which weighed 6,000lb, had a calibre of 6½” and fired shot weighing between 33 and 36 lb. Of slightly smaller calibre, but longer range was the ‘gros culverin of found’ which required the same number of draught animals as did the murtherers. Then were the ‘culverain pykmoyane’ also called a ‘saker’ which fired shot weighing between 7 and 10lb. The smallest of his field pieces was the ‘culverain moyane’, a bronze gun of 1,500lb which had a calibre of 2½”. More mobile were the cart guns, breach loaders, they were also called ‘falcons’.

The Borderers were under the command of Lord Hume(Home), and it was they that opened the campaign with a large scale raid into Northumberland. Much plunder was taken, but at Milfield, on the 13^th August, they were ambushed by English archers, commanded by Sir William Bulmer. The Borderers were badly mauled, losing many men, and their recently acquired plunder, which was regained by the victorious English. About a week later, on the 22^nd August, 1513, king James of Scotland crossed the river Tweed at the town of Coldstream, his army attacking several castles as they progressed.

The earl of Surrey had not been idle, he had been mustering his army, first at Newcastle, then further north at the Percy stronghold of Alnwick. He was joined there by his eldest son Thomas Howard, the Lord High Admiral, who brought with him 1,000 men from the fleet. His second son, (Sir) Edmund Howard also joined his father, as did many of the remaining local lords and gentry. This can be seen as the last time the English long-bowmen were able to overpower the new military arm, field artillery. The English force may have numbered 26,000 men, so the two armies were not that far apart in over all numbers, it would be weapons, tactics and moral which would make all the difference when they finally met on the field of battle.

There are many accounts of what followed, some of which are at the kindest, misleading. This has led to much confusion, and as much speculation about the day of the battle, this hopefully is as close to the known truth as it is possible to get.

On the 4^th of September, there started a correspondence between Surrey and James which these days verges on the comical if the consequences were not to have been so serious. James was officially informed that Surrey was there to give battle. James readily accepted, whereupon dates and places were then arranged for the engagement, a veritable – date with death. It seems that James did not adhere to the spirit of the strictures agreed, having taken up position on Flodden Hill by the 7th. Surrey sent yet another missive to king James “it hath pleased you to chaunge our said promise and putte your self into a grounde more like a fortress or a camp …….” continuing that James should abandon his position and come down to the plain of Milfield. James however, replied with royal dignity “that it besemed not an erle, after that manner to handle a kynge…..” 

This left Surrey in a quandary, the Scottish army had a virtually unassailable position, and it seemed they were not likely to be moved from it. The answer was to tempt the impulsive Scots down from Flodden Hill, the means, a local bandit and his men who knew the terrain.

It is generally agreed that Surrey advanced his army in two main forces, or battles, each divided into two wings. The right, or vanward battle was commanded by Sir Thomas Howard, his younger brother commanding the right wing, Sir Marmaduke Constable of Flamborough commanding the left. Surrey himself commanded the other, the main or rearward battle, the right wing under the command of Lord Dacre and the left commanded by Sir Edward Stanley. 

The numerical dispositions of each force remain in question, but the figures of 9,000 men in the vanward battle, and 5,000 men in the rearward seem to be favoured by several sources. It may have been Surrey’s intention, tactically, to interpose his army across the line of retreat of the Scots thereby severing their lines of communication.It was a bold plan which required both skill and some element of luck to achieve. He sent the vanward and the artillery across the river Till at Twizel bridge at 11 o’clock on the morning. Where the earl and his force crossed is uncertain, though from contemporary chronicles, it appears that they too may have used the same bridge. Stanley’s wing appears to have lagged behind somewhat, and were the last to cross over. The next natural obstacle was a substantial area of bog-land, which had to be traversed by means of a causeway. As the Lord Admiral’s men began to deploy to the south of the village of Branxton, a break in the horrendous weather of strong winds and sheeting rain, revealed the Scottish army drawn up, not on Flodden Hill, but on the much lower, and more accessible Branxton Hill.

Conjecture and some logic must be used to understand why James thought it necessary to relinquish the much stronger position his army had formerly occupied. Considering the weather amongst other things, he witnessed the English marching past his (then) left flank, moving north (possibly) towards Scotland. As the English disappeared into the murk, some disquiet and doubt may have begun to abrade his confidence. It was about noon that the Scottish army was given the order to ‘About face’ and reverse their direction of advance, i.e. northward, in order to occupy the next but lower ridge of Branxton Hill. The Scots, as they took their new positions were in five battles, or columns, four in the line and one in reserve. The (new) left flank were the Borderers, still commanded by Lord Hume(Home) together with the Highlanders commanded by the earl Huntly. On their right were the men commanded by the earl of Errol, and the earls of Crawford and Montrose. 

To their right was the main battle under the personal command of king James IV of Scotland. With him he had the earls of Cassilis and Glencairn and also the lords Herries and Maxwell. On their right, forming the right flank was another force of Highlanders under the command of the earls of Argyll and Lennox. It has been chronicled that each battle was separated from the other by the distance of a bow-shot, approximately 200 yards. At their rear was the Reserve, made up of Lothians commanded by the earl of Bothwell, and with whom were brigaded the Count d’Aussi’s French. It was as they saw the English, advancing towards them over the causeway, that Mr. Borthwick, James’ master gunner was able to commence firing a harmless ‘salute’ at the oncoming English.

Thomas Howard, the Lord Admiral continued to deploy his column on Piper’s Hill, very conscious of his exposed situation, and that if James so decided, his men would have been overwhelmed had the decision been made to attack before Surrey’s men arrived. He sent his father a personal token to reinforce the urgency of the need for alacrity. It worked, and Surrey hastened his column forward. As they arrived at the line, Surrey deployed his forces so that each of James’s was faced by one of his own, though whether Stanley had by this time been able to reach the line , is questionable. Lord Dacre’s ‘pickers’ – light cavalry, seemingly were held as a fast moving, mobile reserve attached to Surrey’s column.

At about 4pm, the blood letting commenced, both sides opening the event with an artillery bombardment, both of which seem to have been equally ineffective. Hume’s Borderers though, either took the brunt of it, or, disliking standing still whilst being shot at, did not stand. They rushed forward towards Edmund Howard’s men, who, being positioned on virtually flat land were somewhat vulnerable. The fighting was hand to hand, brutal and vicious. Some Cheshiremen, not having the stomach for it, departed as quickly as they could, leaving gaps into which Hume’s long pikes were able to do great damage. Several knighted gentlemen were killed, Howard was unhorsed at lease twice, and the column was very close to folding. At this point, Surrey sent Dacre and his horsemen to his son’s aid, though it must be stated that even some of Dacre’s own men deserted at this point. Even so, the remainder crashed into the massed Borderers and broke their attack. Maybe feeling that they had done their day’s work, the Borderers fell back, and took to looting. Neither Hume’s nor Huntly’s men took any further part in what followed.

James may have assumed, having seen the initial success of his left against the English right, that Hume and Huntly would have turned their men against Surrey’s right flank, and on this assumption, ordered his own and Bothwell’s column to advance down off his hill across wet and treacherous terrain into the maw of the English cannon. However, as seen, Hume and Huntly’s men were by then, otherwise occupied, and the Scots were advancing towards a steady and waiting line of Englishmen, a story repeated at Culloden, two centuries later. What ensued was, in the main again, the difference of having the right weapons for the conditions. Carrying their long and heavy pikes slowed the Scottish advance, leaving them vulnerable to shot and arrow, and being insufficiently trained in their use, together with the fact that the pikes were basically meant for use against cavalry made them more of an encumbrance than the expected advantage. As the two armies came into contact, the English bills, simply chopped the pikes into useless sticks.

It may have been at about this stage that Stanley’s column eventually, whatever the cause of their delay, entered the field. Seeing that there was an un-engaged column of Highlanders facing them (Argyll’s and Lennox’s), he launched his men against them before they could reinforce their king. Being Highlanders, they were not clad in the heavy armour as were many of the king’s column, they were therefore a much easier target to damage. Dividing his force, Stanley engaged his foe from the front, while sending a heavy contingent to turn their flank. Faced with such a determined and well disciplined attack, the Highlanders, after some initial resistance, gave way, and were soon in flight, leaving their commanders and a few of their more valiant comrades to be slaughtered. Stanley seeing the state of the battle, read it to perfection, he reformed his column, and launched them into the right rear of James’ column, which by this stage was still being supported on the left by Crawford and Montrose opposing the Lord Admiral.

 By nightfall, the fighting ceased, it ceased for the simple reason that the Scottish army had ceased to exist. The dead and dying were too numerous to count, the carnage, appalling. Daylight the following day revealed more, between 5,000 and 10,000 Scots were dead, they included about two dozen earls and barons; James’ bastard son by Marion Boyd, who was Archbishop of St. Andrews; the Bishops of Caithness, and the Isles; two abbots and many knighted gentlemen and, king James himself; virtually the entire Scottish nobility. Of the English, it has been chronicled that their losses were as low as 400 men, though this undoubtedly is an under-estimation. None of the English commanders were fatal casualties. Without doubt, Stanley’s timely intervention turned the tide, delivered the coup de grace. The entire inventory of the Scottish artillery, all 17 large guns were captured. For the next 25 years, Scotland was left almost without it’s feudal lords, it took a whole generation for those families to recover. Hindsight, and history have tended to blame James for the disaster. Why did he allow himself to be drawn off his hill, why did he not destroy Thomas Howard before Surrey was able to deploy? The truth will never be known, upon such decisions, as with those made by James, history is made. Battles are seldom won, usually they are lost by who ever makes the most mistakes.

For the Howard family, their fortunes were greatly affected, Edmund was knighted on the field, Thomas was created Lord Surrey, and Surrey himself was restored to the family title of Duke of Norfolk. As a unique favour, the royal arms of Scotland were added to those of the Duke of Norfolk as an escutcheon, where it remains to this day.

History though has a habit of turning things on their heads, it was James’ great-grandson, James VI, who, upon the death of queen Elizabeth I of England, was invited to succeed her, which he did, as James I of England, the VI of Scotland on the 24^th March, 1603.

The Scots memorialised their losses at Flodden Field with ‘The Flowers of the Forest’ – a poignant verse which remains known to this day.

We’ll here nae mair lilting at our ewe milking,

Women and bairns are heartless and wae,

Sighing and moaning on a ilka green loaning,

The flowers of the forest are a wede away.

 Author – Richard Hayton

“Diving for the Armada”

 Broadcast 20th January 2002 / Recorded 10th, 11th & 12th July 2001

Time Team Pages – http://www.channel4.com/history/timeteam/kinloch.html

Other links of Interest

http://www.nasscotland.org.uk/projects/klb.html

http://www.nasscotland.org.uk/projects/klb-report.pdf

http://www.highland.gov.uk/cx/pressreleases/archive2001/july2001/armada.htm 

Publications

Brown and Curnow, D H and C (2004)
‘A ceramic assemblage from the seabed near Kinlochbervie, Scotland, UK’ International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 33, 1, 2004, 29-53, 29-53,

McElvogue, D (2002) ‘Doing it in Kinlochbervie’,

Nautical Archaeology, 2002, 3, 2002, 4-5,

Robertson, P (2002) ‘Bagh Poll A’ Bhacain, North Minch, Highland (Maritime – Highland), wreck’,

Discovery and Excavation, Scotland, 3, 2002, 74,

Robertson, P (2004) ‘A shipwreck near Kinlochbervie, Sutherland, Scotland, UK’

International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 33, 1, 2004, 14-28,

Time Team were involved in an archaeological dig on Fetlar from August 26-29th 2002. The programme was shown in the 2003 series.

On their recent visit to Fetlar, Shetland a visit was made by the Yell Young Archaeologists Group to the two sites that were being excavated by Time Team. Yell is the second largest of the Shetland Isles. The membership of YAC in Yell is the whole of Cullivoe Primary School school, all 9 pupils!

They all had a grand day out, and the 3 P7 pupils from last year who have just moved to the local secondary school at Mid Yell also joined the party. After they had finished visiting the site, they then went on a tour of Fetlar listening to stories and tales about the Isle. The school secretary took these photos and has very kindly allowed us to use them on the website – He is actively trying to get other schools involved in Yell, and Unst.

The school website can be found at :http://www.cullivoe.shetland.sch.uk

In 58BC the province of Transalpine Gaul was assigned to Caesar – the area included Northern France, Southern Holland, Belgium, Germany west of the Rhine and most of Switzerland.  

 In his commentaries, Caesar described the area and the peoples of Gaul as such:

Caes.gal.1.1″: [1.1]

“All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are called Celts, in our Gaul’s, the third. All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gaul’s from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are furthest from the civilization and refinement of [our] Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them, and import those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war; for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gaul’s in valor, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage war on their frontiers.

One part of these, which it has been said that the Gaul’s occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone; it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae; it borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches toward the north.  The Belgae rises from the extreme frontier of Gaul extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and look toward the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun, and the North Star.”  

Strabo’s account (Strabo IV.iv. 2,4) also says the whole race is madly keen on war, brave and impetuous and easily outwitted. Because of their frankness and straightforwardness their sympathies are easily roused to war in support of friends who think themselves wronged.

Caesar fought a bloody war to bring these lands and their tribes under his control, which lasted about a year, but spent the next six years fighting a number of rebellions before his conquest of Gaul could be considered to be complete. Caesar, fortunately for us, recorded these in his Bellum Gallicom, which was his own account of the Gallic Wars.

Helveti  

In the spring of 58bc the tribe of the Helvetia who lived in the area of modern Switzerland decided to emigrate en masse into western Gaul. There were only two routes they could have taken – one between the Jura Mountains and the Rhone which was too narrow for wagons to pass through easily – the other through the Roman province. The Helvetia requested permission from Caesar to cross this area – he rather deceitfully told them he would consider their request while at the same time ordered as many fresh troops as possible from throughout the province. When the Helvetia envoys arrived to see Caesar on the appointed day he told them they could not cross the Roman province and that if they tried to use force he would stop them.

The only other alternative the Helvetia had was to go through the territory of the Aedui. In “Caes.gal.1.11”: it states:

“The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands.”

The Aedui sent ambassadors to Caesar requesting help – Caesar heard that three parts of the Helvetii tribes had crossed the River Saone. He set off with three legions and attacked the rest who were still to cross the river – they were laden with baggage and surprised by his attack. Many were slain and the remainder fled to hide in the woods. Caesar then built a bridge over the river and pursued the Helvetia for some time before engaging them in battle where they were defeated. It is telling in Caesar’s commentaries the ruthlessness of his army – the following shows the number of Helvetia who had begun the emigration march compared to the 110,000 who Caesar sent home following the battle.  

Caes.gal.1.29″: [1.29]  

“In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was: 

Veneti

The Veneti on the southern coast of Brittany were a maritime power with strong and extensive trading links to Britain. Their towns were built on promontories, which were difficult to reach by land. In 56bc they rebelled against Caesar by taking prisoner Roman soldiers who had been sent out to procure corn, then captured the envoys sent out to rescue them and demanded that their own hostages be returned to them.  

Caesar ordered ships of war to be built on the River Loire and for rowers, sailors and pilots to be provided.

He knew details of the style of the Veneti ships, which he describes as follows:

“Caes.gal.3.13”:

The keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows were raised very high, and, in like manner the sterns were adapted to the force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence whatever; the benches which were made of planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man’s thumb; the anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for sails they used skins and thin dressed leather.

The battle and the Roman victory that followed are well documented in Cassius Dio Book XXXIX

It is worth noting that Strabo (IV.iv.1) believes that Caesar intended to invade Britain in 56bc and that the reason for the Venetic revolt was to hinder Caesar’s voyage to Britain and to protect their trade there.

Britons had come to the attention of Caesar during his battles with the Gaul’s – he knew that some Britons had crossed the channel to provide military aid. According to Caes gal 4.20, it says ‘ he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gaul’s succors had been furnished to our enemy from that country’

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

In the late summer of 55 BC Caesar made up his mind to prepare an expedition to Britain -he tells us he thought it would be advantageous politically to him to obtain more knowledge about this island and its people.  

The only information he had regarding the south east coast was from Traders and this was scant – he had no idea of what the size of the island was, what customs they used, or even which harbours were convenient for a number of large ships.  

He says in his work  

‘ For neither does anyone expect traders go thither, not even to them was any portion of it known, except the sea coast and those parts, which are opposite to Gaul’  

To obtain this information as quickly as possible before the expedition Caesar sent Caius Volusenus with a warship to do a reconnaissance along the Southeast coast.

In the meantime Caesar moved with all of his forces to the country of the Morini in Gaul where there was the shortest crossing over the channel to Britain. He ordered the ships from the fleet, which he had built the previous year for his war against the Veneti, as well as ships from all neighboroughing countries to assemble there.  

Traders meanwhile had told the Britons the news of Caesar’s intentions – A number of the tribes of Britain sent envoys to Caesar offering hostages and submission to the government of the Roman people.  Caesar met with them  

‘ he after promising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country’.

Caesar sent them back to Britain along with Commius.   Caesar had made Commius the king of the Atrebates after the conquest of that tribe. Caesar obviously thought highly of Commius – his work states  

‘ a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed and who he thought would be faithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those countries’.

Caesar orders him to visit as many of the tribes as he can and urge them to entrust themselves to the protection of Rome and to announce his forthcoming arrival.

Caius Volunus who had reconnoitered the coast without disembarking, returned to Caesar on the fifth day and reported what he had observed – we are not told of his findings in Caesar’s works.

While Caesar’s fleet were being assembled, a large section of the Morini tribe in Gaul sent envoys to Caesar –

In Caes gal 4.22

‘ to please their excuses respecting their conduct on the latter occasion, alleging that it was as men uncivilised, and as those who were unacquainted with our custom, that they had made war upon the Roman people, and promising to perform what he should command ‘.

From Caesar’s point of view this must have seemed fortunate timing – he did not want to leave a hostile tribe behind him,  

‘nor considered that employment in such trifling matters was to be preferred to his enterprise on Britain’.  

He decided therefore to demand a large number of hostages from the Morini and accepted the tribe’s submission.  

In the meantime Caesar assembled his troops of 2 legions of infantry and auxiliaries – the VII and X legions. These were to be transported to Britain in eighty ships. A further eighteen ships which were needed to carry the cavalry were unable to reach the harbour Caesar was in due to winds. Caesar left the harbour in the protection of his Lieutenant Publius Sulpicius Rufus with an adequate garrison force.

Caesar set sail to Britain around midnight and ordered the cavalry to march the eight miles along the coast to their ships, set sail and follow him. The cavalry however conducted this operation too slowly and missed the tide.  

As Caesar reached the coastline of Britain he saw before him tall white cliffs with the massed war parties of chariots and cavalry watching and waiting above him.  

In caes.gal 4.23 he tells us

‘ the nature of the place was this; the sea was confined by mountains so close to it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore’.  

This was an unsuitable place for landing so the ships set anchor and waited for the rest of the fleet to arrive. Caesar held a meeting with his most senior staff, telling them of Volusenus’ findings from his reconnaissance and explained his plans. He reminded them that when he issued orders they must be carried instantly once given. As the weather and tide were in his favour, the ships set off for about 7 miles along the coast until they were along side an open and level shore. The Britons however had followed them along the coast and were waiting for the Romans.  

The size of the Roman ships meant they could only anchor in fairly deeper water and the Roman soldiers were unwilling to jump into the water as they were held back by the weight of their armour and the effect of the waves. However the enemy with their cavalry and charioteers were on familiar ground and were able to hurl their weapons from the shallows and the dry ground. Understandably the Roman soldiers, who were unaccustomed to this type of warfare and had never fought against charioteers, were not exactly enthusiastic to leap from their ships into the water. Caesar was quick to notice their reluctance and ordered the ships of war to be removed from the ranks of the transport ships and positioned towards the open flank of the enemy – these ships contained siege engines as well as being equipped with men using slings and arrows.  

This action caused the enemy to falter – in Caes.gal.4.25 – ‘for the barbarians being startled by the form of our ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which was strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little.  

Caesar’s men still hesitated in their advance onto the beach – but the Aquilifer (who was the most important standard bearer in a Roman legion – a legions eagle standard was its identity and its loss a mortal disgrace) called out prayers to the gods and exclaimed  “Leap, fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general.” 

With this he leapt into the water and made his way towards the enemy. This motivated the Roman troops into action and they too leapt into the water and advanced against the enemy. The battle which followed was fought hard– but the Romans could not keep within their ranks or get a firm foothold. 

They were unable to follow their own standards and joined under the first standard they came across causing great confusion amongst themselves. The enemy however were at home in the shallows and took advantage of their confusion , using their cavalry to ride up and attack them , surrounding them with larger numbers and also throwing their weapons on the exposed flank of the whole group.  Caesar ordered that the warships boats and the spy sloops were filled with soldiers and sent to help the men in distress. 

This help made all the difference to the beleaguered troops – as soon as they all had a footing on dry ground, they attacked the enemy and put them to flight.  Caesar’s troops were not able to follow them for any distance however as the Roman Cavalry had still not arrived.  

Caesar tells us next that after the enemy had regrouped they sent him envoys to ask for peace. With these envoys they also sent along Commius the Atrebatian, who Caesar had sent to Britain earlier to visit all the tribes in an attempt to persuade them to submit to Rome before his arrival.  Commius had been seized on his arrival in Britain after delivering Caesars message and held in chains.  The British claimed to Caesar that this had been done under the instructions of ‘ the common people’. The chieftainship of these tribes was an elected office not a hereditary one, and the chiefs were duty bound to carry out the democratic wished of the peoples.

Peace negotiations between the British chieftains and Caesar went on for 4 days – Caesar demanded hostages from them – some were given immediately but the rest were promised in a few days, as they were to come from remote places.

On the fourth day the sails of the eighteen cavalry ships were spotted from the Roman camp when a sudden storm sprang up. Some of the ships were driven back to their port of departure whilst others were blown down the channel, to the west, where they tried to anchor but the ships started to fill with water from the waves.  They had no choice but to put out to sea during the storm and made for the coast of Gaul.  

For Caesar the disaster did not stop there. That night the moon was full and the tides particularly high – a fact he states was unknown to the Romans. The ships of war which he had drawn up on the beach were waterlogged by the tide and the storm continued to batter the heavier anchored transports until they were dashed together – several ships broke up an the remainder lost their cables, anchors and rigging. The Roman soldiers could only watch helplessly.

The outlook for the Romans must have seemed bleak – they had no provisions for a stay of any length, and no facilities to repair the damaged fleet. This plight was apparent to the Britons still remaining within the Roman Camp and they started to leave in small groups to regroup their forces  – this time they did not attack the Romans in force, but changed to guerrilla warfare tactics to prevent the legions from foraging for grain and provisions.  

Caesar in the meantime had begun the task of repairing his fleet by demolishing the worst damaged ships and using the wood and brass to repair the rest – twelve ships from the eighty were beyond repair. He tells us in caes.gal.4.31   ‘ since that business was executed by the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the loss of twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest’  

Whilst this work was being carried out, members of the VII legion were sent out to reap corn – suddenly the troops on duty at the gate of the camp reported to Caesar that clouds of dust could be seen in the direction the legion had marched. He ordered two cohorts to join him and went to the scene of the action. It was apparent the VII were in great difficulties and were surrounded by the British cavalry and chariots who had ambushed the legion after hiding themselves in the woods.  A small number of the legion had been killed and the rest thrown into confusion. 

When Caesar arrived the British hesitated giving him time to check his panicking legion. Caesar was unable to do much more than withdraw his men back to the camp.

At this point in his commentaries he gives us a first hand description of the War chariots of the British tribes were used in battle. He states in caes.gal.4.33  ‘ Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers in the meantime withdraw some distance form the battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of horse, the firmness of infantry; and by daily practice and exercise attain to such expertness that they are accustomed, even on a declining and steep place, to check their horses at great speed, and manage and turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand on the yoke, and thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity to their chariots again.’  

The war chariots seemed to create havoc among the roman troops – The chariot as a weapon on war was new to the Romans – the Gaels did not use them.

A number of days of extremely bad weather followed this incident which prevented any further hostilities – however the ‘barbarians’ as Caesar called the British had gathered in force for what they considered to be the decisive opportunity for liberating themselves from the Roman invaders and they approached the fortified camp. 

The Romans were however prepared for them and under Caesar’s command were drawn up in disciplined ranks. This time they were on ground of their own choosing. When the action began the outcome was almost inevitable – the British were unable to sustain the attack for long and were pursued across the countryside by about 30 Roman Cavalry led by Commius the Atrebatian 

Caesar tells us they slew a great number of the British.

Caesar met with British envoys the same day, demanding double the number of hostages and that they be delivered to the continent. Caesar knew that the equinox was near and was not prepared to wait any longer than necessary to return to Gaul. The weather was in his favour and he set sail for Gaul in his repaired ships just after midnight.

Caesar clearly took risks in this punitive expedition – we are shown in his commentaries that he did not know how dangerous the conditions of the North Sea were in comparison to navigation in the Mediterranean – what is surprising however is that his experiences didn’t teach him a lesson and it wouldn’t be long before he made the same mistakes again…    

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

After the abortive, and militarily embarrassing events of the previous year, Julius Caesar re-grouped his forces, re-thought his strategy and tactics, and determined to recover some of his dented credibility with another attempt at a landing in Britain. The only sources available, are Classical ones, as stated previously, no records exist from the British viewpoint. It is a well-known phenomenon, that the overall victors are the ones who write the history, in this event only the Roman perspective has come down to us. The veracity therefore of the Classical chronicles, has to be suspect, as has been evidenced by so many revelations about another empire, ironically, the British, which have shown, that there is always another side to every coin. This, together with an almost none-existent archaeological record provides little with which to work. It would be easy to copy verbatim, those same chronicles, and say – this was so – it might not have been so at all, but it is all we have, that, and some insight, and it has to be said, some speculation. 

The first clue to the events of 54B.C. are from Cassius Dio, who in his book XL he states that Caesar “among other undertakings constructed ships of a style half-way between his own swift vessels and the native ships of burden (trading vessels), endeavoring to make them at once as light and as seaworthy as possible and capable of being left high and dry without injury.” This indicates the intention for the ships be capable of being beached, thereby reducing the threat of them being lost to wind and sea while at anchor. It also points to a major military enterprise, the organisation, and logistics required to construct, from scratch, an entire fleet would have been prodigious. Indeed, according to Caesar’s Gallic Wars 5.2, it says “When he arrived there (the army camped on the north shores of Gaul), having made a survey of the winter quarter, he finds that, by the extraordinary ardour (hard work) of the soldiers, amid the utmost scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described above and twenty eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from that state, that they might be launched in a few days.” The ships, as described in this work, were according to this text “For the dispatch (speed) of lading (loading), and for drawing them on shore, he makes them a little lower (shallower draught) than those which we have been accustomed to use in our sea (the Mediterranean); and that so much more, because he knew that, on account of the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the purpose of transporting burdens and a great number of horses, (they were to be) a little broader (wider in the beam) than those which we use in other seas.” It seems, from this, that the invasion fleet, which it has to be viewed as, were of a type of vessel, especially designed for the purpose of transporting a very large body of troops and all their horses, plus equipment and baggage, to a potentially hostile shore, in tidal conditions and unpredictable weather. 

This was no opportunist raid, as 55B.C. may be seen as, this was to be a full sea-bourn invasion. There is, as far as is known, no surviving evidence, archaeological, or otherwise, as to the actual appearance of any of this huge fleet. By the time the repaired vessels of the previous expedition, and private vessels of officers were included, the fleet numbered approximately 800 ships. In order to try and establish the numbers of soldiers employed on this expedition, we are told that there were 2,000 cavalry, if one assumes a minimum of 20 horses to a ship, this accounts for approximately 100 ships. The remaining 700, were manned mainly by soldiers, it seems, therefore, if we again assume a minimum of 50 soldiers to each vessel, on average, then a total number of 35,000 men would appear to be the smallest number required, although no figures are anywhere indicated, there could well have been considerably more. The argument for this force to be larger than 35,000 men is a strong one, because when the four legions under the command of Aulus Plautius landed in 43 A.D., the total number of men has been estimated, and often quoted as being 40,000, and this with one legion less than Julius Caesar.

After some administrative concerns had been dealt with, Caesar was able to concentrate on the project in hand, and according to his own writings, embarked five entire legions and two thousand cavalry, together with, presumably, a substantial quota of Auxiliaries. When the wind and weather were from the appropriate quarter, the fleet set sail, from Boulogne and Port Itius in particular, and possibly other ports on the north Gaulish coast. The night of July 6 is sometimes quoted as being the date of departure, although there is no documentary evidence to support this conjecture. What Caesar describes next, is very telling, and revealing. There has been much debate concerning the actual landing sites for all three landings. This one however, is by far the best described, and leaves little doubt to the area of the landings in Britain, if not the precise location. In Caes.gal.5.8, it states that they “set sail at sunset, and bourn forward by a gentle south-west wind, he was unable to maintain his course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left.” This is quite categorical, what is being described is that the fleet, made considerable leeway, on a tide setting eastward as the wind dropped, this on a roughly northern course, means that the fleet were pushed in the direction of where Dover is today, and beyond. Indeed, for Britain to be on the left, – or port side – means that they had been forced towards the narrows which then separated the mainland from the Isle of Thanet, not the best of places for a landing, with strong tidal currents, tide rips and an uncertain bottom. Instead of Britain being ahead of them, it was to their left, this is a vital clue. Had the tide however set them to the west, then the land would have been on their right (starboard), this therefore has to be excluded as a possibility. However, Caesar seemed aware of both the dangers of his whereabouts, and where he wished to be. At the turn of the tide, and with the aid of their oars (yet another clue to the appearance of the fleet), they altered their course westward. The chronicle continues “Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged them on with the oars, that he might make that part of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer, that there was the best landing place, and in this affair the spirit of the soldiers was very much extolled, for they (the soldiers) with the transports and heavy ships, the labour of rowing not being discontinued, equaled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day:… 

This then provides one answer as to where the landing took place, for if we know the time of year, (July?) and the rate of the tide added to the cruising speed of a Roman galley, and multiply it by the time between sunrise and mid-day, it gives us a distance. From current records, a mean tidal flow rate of ebb/flood tides in the Dover area, is about 70cm per second, which, multiplied up, is roughly 15 kilometers (see : http://www.shom.fr/fr_page/fr_act_geo/TPlidierleb.html ) over six hours between sunrise and mid-day. The maximum speed of war galleys under oars was about 10 – 12k per hour, this however was not maintainable for any length of time, and a cruising speed over the water of this fleet of about 3 – 4k per hour seems more reasonable. Given that the majority of the troops had landed by mid-day, a rowing time of 4 hours would provide a reasonable estimate. This gives us a figure of about 30k, from the point at which the fleet changed it’s course. If they had reached as far north as the area around Sandwich, then, measuring back, this places the landing site somewhere close to the present-day Folkestone. 

Certainly, from the South Foreland light east of Dover, to the western extremity of East Wear Bay, any kind of landing is very unlikely, as this is where the Chalk cliffs of the North Downs drop perpendicularly into the sea. To the west of the Folkestone area, were the Romney Marshes, not the best terrain for military maneuverings, nor does it fit any of the descriptions mentioned in the texts. Next west is the headland of Dungeness, a place also unsuitable for a sea-bourn assault. Anywhere further west similarly, does not fit in with Caesar’s description. It may be no coincidence that Folkestone, was the eastern end of the ancient British trackway known as the North Downs Trackway, which would have been vital for moving large numbers of troops into the British hinterland.

Theorised routes of channel crossing

At this point, is seems appropriate to explain a little about the legions of Caesar. The texts show that each was known by a number at this time, and may have had either official, or, unofficial titles, however, their composition was well established, regardless of some minor adjustments. A Caesarian legion was composed of about 5,000 men, organised into 10 Cohorts, of 500 men each. Legions had an assortment of officers, many of which were political appointments. The Legate, who had nominal command, while under him, were the Tribunes, of which the usual number was 6, these were the military commanders. The legion standard, the Aquila, or ‘Eagle,’ was carried by the Aquilifer. Each cohort was divided into 6 Centuries of 80 men, and each Century had it’s own Centurion in command, with an Optio as his back-up, each had it’s own standard, the Signum, carried by the Signifer, and a trumpeter, called a Cornicen, the trumpets being almost circular in design. Another officer allotted to each Century was the Tesserarius, who’s primary role was concerned with guard duties. There was a small cavalry element attached to each legion, but they served mainly as scouts, and dispatch riders.

The cavalry, as employed by Caesar in 54A.D. were likely, either Gallic or Germanic auxiliaries organised into units called Alae each having a strength of 500 men. Each Alae was divided into 16 Turmae of 32 officers and men. This is by necessity, simplistic, and there are many works that discuss this aspect of military life in pre-empire times in considerably more detail.

The ‘normal’ appearance of a Roman legionary, the common foot-soldier, had yet to make an appearance, although their weapons were the all familiar Gladius (short stabbing sword) Pilum (javelin with soft metal head designed to bend on penetrating impact either on shield, horse, or man, in order to kill, wound or hamper the movements of the unfortunate recipient.) The shield, oval at this period, was called a Scutum, while helmets were of an almost conical design in some cases, round in others with descending cheek guards and simpler to the later well known types, any crests were likely to have been horse hair plumes. The body armour was a tunic of mail, rather than the almost ubiquitous Lorica Segmentata, the hooped metal plate armour of later periods, also lacking seems to have been the studded leather straps which protected the groin area.

These then were the legionaries who disembarked onto what they feared would be a hostile shore. However, the British, who had gathered together under a single war chief, a man called Cassivellaunus who was ricon – or king of the Catuvellauni people who’s domain reached from the northern banks of the river Thames into the current Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire. According to Caesar, who’s account it is now necessary to follow, after seeing the quantity of ships landing troops, the watching Britons, located on the hills and cliffs overlooking the landing beaches, retreated. It may be however, that those were a scouting party, sent to determine where the Romans had landed, and – once seeing them ashore – departed to report to their king. Once ashore, a suitable location was found for the construction of a camp – it is unfortunate that no archaeological evidence for this place has been discovered, for it would resolve once and for all, where, exactly, this event took place. The fleet, he left at anchor, under the guardianship of ten cohorts, possibly two from each legion, and three hundred cavalry, who, it must be assumed, secured the camp, and the beachhead. It means that nearly 6,000 men were left to guard the ships, and the beach, which would be required to land them on, should the weather once again prove to be dangerous. The idea of leaving the fleet at anchor, knowing how treacherous the weather could be, suggests that Caesar was concerned that the British might be tempted to attack the camp, and if possible burn the ships, which would have left him and his army totally isolated. Safer therefore to leave them at anchor for as long as possible, and only beach them under the direst of meteorological threats. Caesar left Quintus Atrius in command of the guard, and the fleet. According to Caesar’s account, the army then proceeded to advance in the direction taken by the retreating British for a distance of twelve miles, where he says, they saw the enemy, advancing towards ‘the river.’ This river is assumed to be the river Stour, and this, geographically, is difficult to rationalise, as there is no part of the southern Kent coast that lies within a twelve-mile radius of that river. If the Folkestone area was the landing site, then it may be assumed, that the British would have retreated along the ‘North Down’s Trackway’, which terminated close to that site. The other, often quoted landing place is Deal, north of Dover, this location suffers from the same inconsistency of geography, being almost equidistant from Bigbury, as the proposed Folkestone site. It is logical also to assume, that in order to move over 30,000 men, such a track-way would be necessary for any kind of rapid advance. As the legions climbed the heights of the North Downs, the British commenced what can only be described as hit and run tactics, harrying the legions using their cavalry and chariots. Of any river crossing, Caesar makes no mention at this point, so maybe, it was of small military importance, he continues to say however, that the British had refortified what can only have been a hill-fort. Theories abound, but it seems generally accepted, that the site of this fort was at Bigbury, just west of the present day Canterbury. Of the fort Caesar says this “they concealed themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war, for all the entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees.” This describes a place that had been prepared in advance, a place where some consideration had been given to either delaying, or halting the Roman progress. Warriors were also hidden in the woods close by, from which they sallied forth to defend the fort’s entrances. Resistance was valiant – if futile – the soldiers of the 7th legion formed a testudo – or tortoise, then threw up a rampart against the fort’s defences. The testudo, was a formation of men in close order which were able to use their shields to make an impenetrable shell for the whole number of men enclosed. The interlocked shields covered the front, sides, rear, and top of the formation. This now familiar tactic, was revolutionary to the British, they had no clue how to either attack it, or defend against it. Having breached the fort’s defences, the battle was virtually over, after some sporadic fighting, the British withdrew, leaving it in the possession of the successful 7th legion, who suffered, but few casualties. Caesar then refortified the site to Roman specifications, and settled his army down within its earthen walls and ramparts for a well deserved rest. The following morning, in an attempt to discover in which direction the British had withdrawn, the column was divided into three, and ordered to scour the countryside for any sign of them. It was not long before the stragglers of the British were found, but at about the same time, messages were received at Caesar’s headquarters, that disaster had, once again, hit the fleet of anchored ships. A storm had arisen during the previous night, and damaged or destroyed many of the ships. Quintus Atrius reported by messenger that most of the fleet had been sunk, or badly damaged. After Caesar’s experience of 55B.C., he was nervous about this news, it was, most likely, the worst thing that could befall the expedition. The columns were immediately recalled, and he personally returned to the beachhead to find out the exact extent of the damage. It was not as bad as he feared, about forty ships had been lost, and many others damaged, but mostly, not beyond repair. Orders were issued to selected workmen from the legions to set about repairing those ships which could be repaired, and a message was sent back across the Channel – to Labenius – to instigate the rapid construction of as many more new ships as could be produced by the legions he had with him on the Continent to replace those lost. He then ordered all the still floating ships to be hauled ashore, for their future security. It was a massive task to ask of his legionaries, as it was necessary also to extend the fortified camp on the shore to include all the soon to be beached vessels. It took ten days, and nights, of unremitting labour to complete the whole endeavour, after which the fleet was safely beached behind extended and reinforced fortifications. Such a strongly defended position would, one assumes, have left at least some archaeological evidence, but to date, nothing of it has been found. It might be that the site has in the intervening two millennia, been eroded away, and has fallen into the sea. This argues against the Folkestone site, as, the land there has in fact extended from the Roman shore, and, it would by now be a considerable distance inland. Where ever the site was, Caesar left the same ten cohorts and cavalry to defend the beach, and set off back to Bigbury fort where the Britons had taken advantage of the hiatus to regroup, reinforce, re-organise, and re-think their tactics. It has to be said here, that Caesar’s Gallic Wars, as helpful as it maybe, can also be unhelpful too. The next part of his narrative speaks of several encounters between the two forces, but lacks any indication as to location. All he says is this and that occurred at ‘the camp,’ though whether this was still Bigbury camp, or later marching camps, remains a unresolved. Logic dictates, that he was referring to marching camps, as his column advanced into the lands of the Cantiaci. As there is also made mention of ‘miles’ as a distance, this needs to be defined. A Roman mile, or mille passuum, was a distance of 1,000 paces measured at 5 feet per pace. This means a Roman mile was 5,000 feet, as opposed to 5,280 feet in the British Statute mile, and compares with the kilometre of 1.48 per Roman mile. It has also been suggested that a Roman legion could march between 15 and 30 m.p. a day. This would depend heavily on the terrain, and the access to their own paved roads, or lack of them.

Cassivellaunus, as said, had been made overall war leader of the British tribes, this would not have sat very well with several of them, as leader of the Catuvellauni he had been responsible for the overpowering of many of the disaffected tribes, their homeland was north and west of the River Thames, although their influence spread much further, and it might have been Cassivellaunus’s own personality which enabled the temporary alliance between tribes, because such a concept of cooperation was not alien to their way of life. Spies and informants reported some of this to Caesar as his army advanced west into Kent, and north towards the Thames. His intention may have been to take, capture, or kill Cassivellaunus, and thereby removing in one fell swoop, the resistance of the tribes. What ever his motives, Caesar had to find a ford across the heavily tidal river Thames. It was during the advance when, after an un-successful raid by British chariots, and cavalry, that an over zealous section of Romans chased too far, and consequently became isolated from the main column, Caesar reports several deaths as a result. Another encounter was at the site of a marching camp where engineers, engaged in fortifying the camp, were unexpectedly attacked by a large force of British. Two cohorts were sent as reinforcements, but they, being from different legions, did not form a close enough unit, which allowed the British to engage the gap between the cohorts, and thereby make their escape. The death of Quintus Laberius Durus, a tribune, was reported. Caesar says at this point “In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took place under the eyes and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the weight of their arms, in as much as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse [cavalry] also fought with great danger, because the [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat, and to those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed [in different parts]; and then one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded [replaced] the wearied.” The day after the above events there occurred yet another attack while the legionaries had been instructed to do some foraging. The attack came from all quarters, and even got within striking distance of the revered legionary eagles. The danger to their eagles might have been the spur required for the legions to regroup, and after awaiting the arrival of the cavalry arm a counter attack was made with great success. So great was the victory, that afterwards, any attacks that were made were puny in comparison, and of small account. The allied tribes however had not been defeated, they had withdrawn to yet another fortified line of defence, the River Thames. This seems quite unequivocal Caes Gal 5.18 states “Caesar, having discovered their design, leads his army into the territory of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames which river can be forded in one place only, and that with difficulty.” This now poses the question, how did Caesar know it was the river Thames – was it the same waterway as that known today? In order to check this it is necessary to venture into the original Latin text – which says – ‘flumen Tamesim’ – river Tamesem, when then, and from where did the Tamesem part come from? According to a dictionary of English place names it says ‘ Thames – Tamesis 51B.C. An ancient Celtic river name possibly meaning ‘dark one’ or simply ‘river’’. Which means that the river Thames could actually mean – river River !! If this is so – then the finite acceptance that Caesar did cross the Thames may not be finite at all.

It has been suggested that the Thames had several crossing points, not bridges, but fords, or causeways. Locations for these fords have been proposed, they include, Battersea, Brentford, and Westminster, all of which have been verified as possible fords by archaeologists. The Westminster site seems to be the current favourite. There was an extension of the later built Watling Street which appears to have crossed the river in that location, and there is evidence of an island off the northern bank which has been called Thorney, and it has to be said, that Caesar also mentions ‘alteram fluminis ripam’ – a second river bank, which would have to be assaulted in the case of a ford at this point. However, it must be pointed out that all this is conjecture, and the locations of roman crossing places of the Thames is still a hotly debated topic amongst academics.

The Britons had very likely, by means of false information lead Caesar to the desired ford because when the legions approached the south bank, the opposite bank was lined with a great multitude of warriors and the river banks had been fortified with stakes embedded into the ground, some above water, some below. Caesar did not hesitate long and dispatched his cavalry across the river, and then ordered forward his legions in support. The defences were not very effective, and the Romans landed in relative safety immediately falling upon the enemy. Likely surprised by the ease with which the Romans had crossed the barrier of the river, the British quickly lost heart, and made their escapes as best they could. Cassivellaunus was able to retain control of over 4,000 chariots, and, as they withdrew into their own heartland, they drove before them all the cattle and people, thereby depriving the advancing legions of plunder, slaves, and food stocks. The cavalry were instructed, after several sorties had been ambushed, not to venture too far from the relative security of the legions. The defeat of Cassivellaunus at the Thames seems to have been the catalyst for a more general revolt of his self imposed authority. Several disaffected tribes began to make embassies to Caesar, premier among them was Mandubratius of the Trinovantes who’s father had been slain by Cassivellaunus. The offer to surrender them selves to Rome, rather than endure the dominance of other Britons might appear a strange thing to do. It could be however, that the prospect of peace and security, under the umbrella of Rome was more appealing than their own British heritage, a concept, which may not have then been apparent to them. In exchange for their promised loyalty, the tribes invited Caesar to install a Roman dignitary to oversee their protection and interests from a vengeful Cassivellaunus, a Roman who by his simple presence would hopefully deter any incursions into Trinovantian lands. Caesar readily agreed, but added the provisos that forty hostages be handed over, and his army be provided with as much corn as they required. Once the negotiations had been completed between Caesar and the Trinobantes, other tribes soon followed suit. Those named by Caesar were the Cenemagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, all of which sent embassies to Caesar. It was – it is said – from these embassies that Caesar learned of the location of the ‘command centre’ of Cassivellaunus, and that it was not far from his present location.

While these events had been happening north of the Thames, to the south of that river, Cassivellaunus had used what remained of his authority with those tribes still loyal to him, those who’s kings were called Cingetorix, Carvillius, Taximagulus and Segonax to rally their warriors, and assemble them ready for an all out attack on the fortified landing site and beached fleet of ships, which were Caesar’s sole line of communication with Gaul. Likely as a result of an uncoordinated attack by the rival British kings, they were soon defeated with heavy losses, to such a degree that news of the disaster was immediately sent north to Cassivellaunus. He however, had trouble enough of his own to contend with. Caesar had discovered the whereabouts of his main camp, which had been fortified with ditches and earthen walls. Approaches to the camp were made difficult by the proximity of dense woodlands and bog-land. It must have seemed a formidable place to assault. 

It was not however Caesar’s way, to procrastinate, and he launched an attack from two directions, which was decisive. The British fled to an enclave within the camp where “A great many cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.” 

The location of this last stand it has been claimed, was at the earthwork known today as Devil’s Dyke, at Wheathampstead, in Hertfordshire, just north of the later Roman settlement called Verulanium, today called, St. Albans. Evidence of Belgic occupation of the site circa 50 B.C., was discovered by Sir Mortimer Wheeler, when he excavated there in the 1930’s. The ditch has been estimated as being130 feet wide at the top, and 40 feet deep, and though much eroded, much of it’s impressiveness can still be envisaged there today. It may be surmised that this earthwork was linked to another very close by, called the Stad, being as they are, even today almost linked by a wet ditch called The Moat. 

If these three features were combined in 54 B.C. they would have made an enormous rectangular enclosure defended on at least three sides. The northern side, is seemingly open, although it might be possible that any defensive features on this side have been lost. A display board in a local museum says “For at least 100 years before the Roman Conquest in AD 43 this part of Hertfordshire was the heartland of a powerful and aggressive tribe known as Catuvellauni, Celtic for ‘expert warrior’….. The earliest capital of the Catuvellauni is likely to have been at Wheathampstead. ….. Here are massive earthworks known as Devil’s Dyke. ……… This was attacked by Julius Caesar in 54 BC. “

Cassivellaunus, learning of the betrayal of several tribes, the massive defeat on the Kent coast, which added to the devastation of his own lands, and the huge loss of life of his people and his warriors, had no other option but to sue for peace. Though the intermediary, Commius, an Atrebatian, arrangements were made for the hand over of hostages, and the payment of tribute to Rome. Agreement was also extracted for Cassivellaunus not to take revenge, or make war upon either Mandubratius, or the Trinovantes as a whole. News had arrived that revolt had broken out in Gaul, and Caesar was desperate to return there to restore Roman authority. Consequently, subsequent to the reception of the hostages and tribute, the legions made their way back to the waiting fleet, who’s losses had been replaced, and repairs all but completed ready for the embarkation of the army and it’s acquired masses of prisoners. The season too made it imperative that the crossing be made with dispatch, as the equinoctial storms were soon expected, and Caesar needed his legions intact for Gaul. So it was that the Roman army left British shores, not to return for almost a hundred years, a hiatus which was to see many changes, both in Rome, and in Britain. It seems, after this span of time to be an anti-climactic end to such a great endeavour, indeed, from some contemporary commentaries, it seemed so at the time too, as Caesar returned with no grand plunder, and seemingly nothing to show for the entire campaign. His legacy was however to influence British tribal politics for the next hundred years, and for those tribes who had embraced the arrival of the Romans, it began a period of pre-Romanisation, which would eventually lead to historic consequences.

It cannot be over emphasised just how much of the above narrative depends on the writings of Caesar, not an especially unbiased account of things. Much remains speculation, and argument and debate continue amongst academics. Archaeology has yet to prove or disprove most of the above, and, while discoveries are still being made, they remain sparse, and inconclusive.

I came, I saw, I conquered!

As a brief aside, a post-script, and to clarify a minor oft quoted misconception, it is sometimes said that Julius Caesar uttered the immortal words “Veni vedi vici” at the conclusion of his British expeditions of 55 B.C. and 54 B.C. It is necessary here to correct this perceived error which has somehow crept into British historical myth. It was several years after Caesar had turned his army, his thoughts, and his back on the British Isles, when, after the military competition between himself and his rival for control of Rome, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known more generally to history as, Pompey, came to an end with the murder of Pompey in Egypt. His ignoble end came as a result of his army being defeated by that of Caesar’s at the battle of Pharsalia in August, 48 B.C. After a brief dalliance in Alexandria with the Egyptian queen, Cleopatra, his presence was required at the location of a small local disturbance in north-eastern Anatolia where, Pharnaces, king of the Cimmerian Bospherus, in 47 B.C. had taken advantage of Caesar’s pre-occupation in Egypt to try and regain his father’s kingdom of Pontus. Suetonius, writing in c110A.D. says that Caesar “vanquished him in a single battle within five days after his arrival and four hours after getting sight of him” He later continues to describe Caesar’s triumphal return to Rome “In his Pontic triumph he displayed among the show-pieces of the procession an inscription of but three words, “I came, I saw, I conquered,” [ ‘Veni, vidi, vici’] not indicating the events of the war, as the others did, but the speed with which it was finished.” (Suetonius : De Vita Caesarum Divas Julius) This hopefully will lay to rest any lingering speculation regarding the origin of a very famous quotation.

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/asbook.html

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton