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The channel crossing according to Dio “They were sent over in three divisions, in order that they not be hindered in landing as might happen to a single force, and in their voyage across they became discouraged because they were driven back in their course, and then plucked up courage because of a flash of light rising in the east shot across to the west, the direction in which they were sailing. So they put into the island and found none to oppose them.” This last is interesting because, unlike 55 and 54BC, this landing was apparently either in friendly territory, or, the Britons were taken completely by surprise. The latter seems unlikely on account of the protracted preparations, abortive mutiny, and delays that the expedition had endured. Traders, informants, fisherfolk, all would have reported the preparations for the imminent Roman arrival, providing enough time for local chieftains to raise their war bands had the Roman landing been uninvited or unwished for. Dio provides a clue regarding this when he wrote “…. for a certain Bericus, who had been driven out of the island as a result of an uprising, had persuaded Claudius to send a force thither.” If Dio is to be taken at his word, then this may have been more of a policing action to settle a local British dispute than it was an outright invasion. The question has to be therefore asked whether the arrival of Plautius and his army in 43AD was actually intended as an invasion.
Opposition to the arrival of a Roman army on British soil was eventually organised by the two sons of a recalcitrant, though deceased chief of the Catuvellauni tribe called, Cunobelin, the elder of which was called Caratacus, and the younger, Togodumnus. This minor dynasty was responsible for expanding their tribal lands at the expense of their near neighbours the Atrebates, Trinovantes and the Cantium, and it could have been their ambition which prompted Plautius’s expedition. An expedition which was seen as protecting those tribal leaders who were sympathetic to Rome and her ways, it may have began as nothing more than an attempt to restore the status quo, rather than a long term military commitment. According to Cassius Dio, “the Britons as a result of their inquiries had not expected that they (the Romans) would come, and had therefore not assembled beforehand. And even when they did assemble, they would not come to close quarters with the Romans, but took refuge in the swamps and the forests, hoping to wear out the invaders in fruitless effort, so that, just as in the days of Julius Caesar, they would sail back with nothing accomplished.” (Dio book LX 60 – xix) He continues “Plautius accordingly, had a deal of trouble in searching them out; but when at last he did find them, he first defeated Caratacus and then Togodumnus, the sons of Cynobellinus, who was dead. After the flight of these kings he gained by capitulation a part of the Bodunni, who were ruled by a tribe of the Catuvellauni; leaving a garrison there, he advanced further and came to a river.”
The above passages provide for an alternative reason for the Briton’s failure to attack the Romans while they were at their most vulnerable. If Dio is to be accepted, then the two warlords were hoping that this would turn out to be another brief excursion, that Plautius took it upon himself to extend and expand on his unforeseen luck of an unopposed landing can only be seen as a major error of judgement by Caratacus and Togodumnus. Dio’s words “searching them out” is also ambiguous, did he mean searching out the native army, or did he mean searching for the two brothers. Were they the reason for Plautius being there in the first place? If so, then the invasion once more begins to look more like a policing action to rid the island of what he saw as constant trouble makers. Provided Richborough, or a site close by was the landing place, the river to which Dio refers can, geographically, only have been the Medway which meanders its way southwards from its estuary west of the present Isle of Sheppey, past Maidstone and west through Tonbridge. The alleged site of the battle has recently been commemorated by the setting up of an engraved stone at the village of Snodland (TQ 71 62) on the present A228 a short distance northwest of Maidstone. The village lies close to the ancient trackway now called “The Pilgrim’s Way”, where it crosses the Medway but while the Pilgrim’s Way crosses the Downs in a west-north-westerly direction from Ashford to Maidstone, the more northern route which later became Watling Street leads almost directly west from Richborough to Maidstone. Archaeological evidence to support the northern route was discovered in 1957, when a hoard of 34 gold coins dated to 41AD was found at Bredgar near Sittingbourne. Frere (Britannia pp 64) says that this amount “…..was too small to represent a subsidy to some native prince, but it is too large to be the savings of and ordinary legionary soldier; moreover, the coins show progressive decrease in wear from the earliest to the latest, which suggests they represent a cross-section of the currency…….. Such a large sum (three months’ pay for a centurion) was probably the property of an officer, concealed before some skirmish, and it reinforces the view that the army passed north of the Downs by the route later laid out as Watling Street.” The hoard is currently housed at the British Museum.
In John Manleys book AD 43 – a reassessment he states the following :
“On 30 July 1957, when a trench was being dug for the foundations of a bungalow, 33 gold aurei were found and a subsequent search produced one further coin (Carson 1960). There was no sign of a container but since some of the coins were still stacked together the implication was that they had been packed in rolls and wrapped in cloth which had rotted. The coins range from Julius Caesar to Claudius with the four latest issued in the reign of Claudius in AD 41-2. The latest coins were in mint condition but the earlier coins were worn. Since no native coins were found with the hoard the find was associated with Roman as opposed to indigenous ownership. Pay for an ordinary centurion was about 150 aurei per year, and it was concluded that the 34 aurei could well have represented the personal savings of someone of the rank of centurion or upwards in the legions which invaded Britain in 43AD. Of course the location of the village of Bredgar, on the downs some 10 miles (16km) to the east of the Medway, and just before the line of the hills begins to descend towards the Medway, raised the obvious possibility that an official might have concealed these savings at the army’s last halting place before the battle of the Medway.
Superficially the argument is plausible, but underlying it are numerous assumptions: for instance that the hoard was concealed in the summer of AD43 , that it did belong to a Roman Officer, that it was hidden by him and not stolen from him , that the officer was part of an invading unit heading for the Medway – all these things are unknowable. In addition it seems debatable whether and campaigning officer fighting in a contested invasion would carry with him his personal savings. What did Roman soldiers do with their pay when they were on the march? Surely pay, or any savings accrued, were kept in safely guarded stores, capable of being redeemed by an individual when the progress of the campaign allowed some leisure time. In addition , it again seems likely that an officer would deliberately conceal a personal fortune , knowing that his army was on the march and would stay at a particular location for only a brief period of time. In reality the Bredgar Hoard may imply the presence nearby of the Roman Military but it tells us nothing of the size of the force, the year in which it was present , the direction it was taking, and least of all is it proof for the battle of the Medway.
The hoard could just as easily represent payment to a British Chief who collaborated with the invasion force.”
In Autumn 1999 Kent Archaeological Field School announced discovery of a possible 4 acre Roman Fort at Syndale near Faversham.
At Snodland there has been a local ferry across the Medway to Burnham since at least the 16th century. There is no mention of there ever having been a ford in the immediate vicinity. This might be evidence for other renditions of these events, but for the sake of narrative, it requires a decision to be made, as with so much of this period. Snodland and it’s environs were the sites of extensive marsh-lands, drained since the 19th century and before. Those marshes used to extend south from Rochester (Durobrivae) almost to Aylesford, they often extended for a few hundred yards on both banks of the river making the prospect of chariot warfare very unlikely. It becomes more apparent to this writer that any successful crossing of the Medway HAD to take place where the river banks were capable of withstanding the use of both cavalry and chariots, similarly marsh and bog would have hindered the legions ability to manoeuvre. It is with these things in mind that the suggestion is made that the crossing could not have occurred at Snodland, but rather only either at Rochester where the river is narrow, and swimmers could have traversed at slack water, or that it took place much further south, even near Larkfield, where there is evidence of Roman occupation. Rochester however lies along the route of Watling Street, there was a crossing, though at that time, no bridge, it seems right, it seems to fit the scenario.
In addition John Manley tells us “A military style ditch , deliberately backfilled , was located beneath the later villa at Eccles in the mid-1970’s , just to the East of the Medway and reasonably close to the Medway Monument. The ditch was traced east-west for a length of 92.65m. no corners were located and the ditch contained pottery apparently earlier than AD65. However the full report is still to be published.”
To close this vague section, it might be helpful to have it summarised by the words of the closing conclusion from the special symposium on the landing places hosted by the Sussex Archaeological Society, 23rd October, 1999, spoken by Professor Barry Cunliffe of Oxford University. “In summarising what everyone agreed to be a very stimulating and worthwhile conference, Professor Cunliffe reinforced the point that he had made at the very start of the day, that it is vital to be open-minded and unprejusticed in all archaeology. Tradition has no god-given right to be correct and we should always try to focus on a problem without being too partisan. In the 1880’s Clausentum (Southampton Water) was suggested as the landing place for the AD43 invasion. The discovery of the structures at Richborough brought that site into prominence, and gradually new Solent ideas re-emerged while Kent was quoted in the major textbooks. Hind’s article in 1989 has thrown another light on the subject, bringing the bias back to Sussex. There is no doubt that the invasion was set in a complex geopolitical context and the debate should continue, using an open mind to consider the evidence.” It is hoped that this site, while adhering to the traditional, has looked at the evidence with an open mind.
The Medway Crossing
The physical obstacle posed by the river Medway led to what might arguably be seen as one of the most decisive battles on British soil, for it’s eventual outcome led to nearly 400 years of Roman authority. The name Medway might stem back to pre-Roman days, one theory being that it derives from ‘Medu’ meaning either mead or sweet water. The two armies ranged up facing each other, with Plautius’ legions constantly maneuvering in order to keep the British tied down observing their movements in order to best counter them whenever and however they decided to attempt the river crossing. It was on the west bank of the Medway the Britons had decided to make their stand, thinking that the river would provide sufficient of a barrier, enough to give them the advantage. Of the battle, Dio says “The barbarians thought that the Romans would not be able to cross it (the river) without a bridge, and consequently bivouacked in rather careless fashion on the opposite bank; but he (Plautius) sent across a detachment of Germans, who were accustomed to swim easily in full armour across the most turbulent of streams.” This translation, states that it was a Germanic unit that swam over the river, but others are equally as adamant that it should read – Κελτους – which, they say translates as Keltoi or, Celts, but no reference is made to their origin be them from northern Gaul, Germanic tribes or indeed, Britain. Tacitus however does mention the Batavians, and that there were eight cohorts of them, a force which would amount to no less than 4,000 men. So who were these elite troops, soldiers able to swim rivers in full armour, the Batavi? They came from what is today northern Holland, a people who were excellent horsemen brought up in the winding waterways of the Low-countries.
It seems likely that they were mixed units of cavalry and infantry strongly loyal to Rome, to the point that they had the honour of proving the guard cavalry to Julius Caesar. Their method of traversing water-causes would likely have been by clinging onto their horses mains, or their saddles, this could enable each horse to support two men, it’s rider, and another. As soon as Plautius ordered their advance, they entered the waters of the Medway, and soon were able to make a crossing that took the Britons totally by surprise. They had orders to disable the enemy’s horses, which would disable their most formidable fighting arm, their chariots. The constant movement of Roman troops would have permitted these cohorts to slip out of British observation to a place where they could cross the river without being seen. That objective was successfully accomplished, and their appearance behind the ranks of bemused Britons led to their total confusion. Their main weapon was being decimated; their chariots and their horses would no longer be of any practical use to them. As the Britons tried to salvage what they could from the assault of the Batavi, this enabled Plautius to launch his main assault with his heavy infantry, his legions. Led by Flavius Sabinus and Vespasian, (presumably) with the Legio II Augusta (although there is no evidence to support the presumption), the legions made a safe crossing, and established a bridgehead on the west bank of the Medway. Fighting became fierce in the extreme as the forces of Caratacus attacked the legions. Of Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus), who was to become emperor in 69AD, until his death in 79AD., Suetonius has little to say regarding these events in Britannia, in his De Vita Caesarum–Divus Vespasianus iv, he says “In the reign of Claudius he was sent in command of a legion to Germania, through the influence of Narcissus; from there he was transferred to Britannia [See Claud. xvii], where he fought thirty battles with the enemy.” The subsequent conquest of the Isle of Wight (Vecits) by Vespasian received far more comment in contemporary biographies than did his adventures prior to the Emperor’s arrival on land of the British. Not enough is mentioned that adds to our knowledge of this campaign, while other events in the same biography receive far more in-depth coverage. This could be indicative that legend and tradition has been at work over the centuries, or that his involvement at Medway was not considered that decisive. To the rallying call of their bronze war horn, called the Carnax, the Britons rallied and fought for their king, their land, and their way of life. In ever increasing desperation they threw themselves at the steady lines and phalanxes of the roman cohorts. The day closed with neither side able to claim victory, the British withdrew to nearby woodlands, and rested, the legions too took as much sleep as adrenaline and battlefield conditions would permit. The following day dawned and conflict resumed, a second day of battle, a rare event for those times, such was the determination and desperation with which this was fought. Their lack of effective cavalry and the use of their chariots though eventually began to tell. However, decisive actions were necessary to bring about a victory, according to Dio, “the struggle was indecisive until Gnaeus Hosidius Geta, after narrowly missing being captured, finally managed to defeat the Barbarians so soundly that he received the ornamenta triumphalia, though he had never been a consul.” Precisely what actions were taken by Geta might never be known, although many have speculated, they were though, sufficient on the day for him to receive an honour from the emperor. The ornamenta triumphalia had evolved from the more traditional Roman triumphs, which had become the preserve of the imperial family. To compensate, this honour was introduced which allowed for the recipient to be granted titles, to be allowed to appear in public wearing the robes of imperators and to be able to bequeath to their descendants, triumphal statues. It is often stated that Geta was the Legate of the Legio II Augusta, and therefore, it was that legion which he led against the British. It seems logical, but again, there is no supportive evidence of any kind. The actions taken by Geta were enough to break the fighting spirit of the Britons, and they withdrew towards the next natural barrier. Caratacus and his brother must have been able to contain the defeat for rather than becoming a rout, there was a semi-organised retreat towards the River Thames.
Dio says “Thence the Britons retired to the river Thames at a point near where it empties into the ocean and at flood tide forms a lake. This they easily crossed because they knew where the firm ground and the easy passages in this region were to be found.”(LX 60. xx) Once again, the question of location raises its enigmatic head. Many have been the theories as to where the description of Dio leads. Current research has shown that there was/may have been, a gravel bank forming a shallow ford crossing the Thames in the vicinity of Westminster and Lambeth. What today is Westminster was in the 1st century, an island which has been called Thorney Island, one of the earlier Time Team programs, while excavating the grounds of Lambeth Palace, had a look at the river, and local knowledge suggested that remnants of this bank survive. Down stream from this was the tidal head of the Thames, between the current Westminster Bridge and London Bridge is even today called the Pool of London.
The riverbanks then were not as those of today which have been manicured by man. Then they were open and likely to flood at high water. This would have resulted in swamps and reed beds which the heavily armoured legions would have found difficult to navigate in the best of circumstances, and might account for what seems to be lacking from Dio’s description of the forthcoming battle, the legions. The Celts (Batavi) were once more employed to swim the river, while others managed to find a bridge further up-stream. Any bridge would have been a rudimentary affair compared to the massive structures built by Caesar, and may only have supported a few men crossing at any one time. Dio makes no mention that this bridge was defended, which seems odd, but sufficient men were able to cross for them be able to aid their mounted comrades down-stream.
From Dio it appears that the two forces outflanked the waiting Britons and were able in inflict many casualties. The lack of horses to drive their chariots and to mount their cavalry would have hindered British tactics and their ability to manoeuvre. They were caught in the jaws of the typical Roman style pincer tactic. Meanwhile, the legions seem to have got themselves lost in the reed beds and marshes, incurring enough casualties, likely from drowning, for Dio to make mention of it “In pursuing the remainder incautiously, they got into the swamps from which it was difficult to make their way out, and so lost a number of men.” This defeat of the Britons was decisive on the day, and they melted away, resistance it seems had stopped. An event happened soon after the battle finished which seems ambiguous. Dio LX 60.xxi states “Shortly afterwards (the battle) Togodumnus perished, but the Britons, so far from yielding, united all the more firmly to avenge his death. Because of this fact and because of the difficulties he had encountered at the Thames, Plautius became afraid, and instead of advancing any further, proceeded to guard what he had already won, and sent for Claudius.” Once more, there could be a question mark over the translation of the text here, and personally lacking the knowledge, I have used the words from the above-mentioned web site – “The conventional translation gives that the death of Togodumnus occurred later but the text seems to state quite plainly that it was because of the death of Togodumnus and its effect on the rest of the Britons that Plautius became alarmed. Also the use of jqapentoV the Aorist Passive Participle of the verb jqeirw, to describe the death itself is a strange choice because the strict translation of this verb in the Passive is not so much ‘to kill’ as ‘to destroy.’ Something is done to the individual that causes his death, unlike the usual apokueinw which means ‘to kill’, pure and simple, in the Active as well as the Passive. Togodumnus was a prince of Britain whose father, Cunobelin had reigned for forty years and whose patron had been Augustus himself. If Togodumnus had died normally in a normal battle then it cannot surely have caused anything other that the normal reaction to a warrior’s death, however noble. There seems from the text something abnormal about his death that roused normally placid Britons to fight in his name. Could he have been executed? Could the Celts on the Roman side have taken revenge for things that Togodumnus had done during the insurrection? Had he been captured first then formally been put to death instead of being given the usual courtesy afforded to noble prisoners that had been captured in battle. It would seem that Plautius had nothing to do with it because of its effect on Plautius and on the Britons. Note that it was the effect not only on the BarBaroi but the BreTTanoi as well. The occasion and the manner of his death had united the ‘Barbarians’ and the ‘Britons’ and this was the fact that alarmed Plautius and caused him to alert Claudius. This would seem to indicate that up until then the whole venture could not have been thought to be on the scale of an invasion. If four legions and their auxiliaries had been present, the reaction of Plautius would not have been that of alarm. It would have been the culmination of what he had come for and it is nonsensical to suggest that he would have sent for Claudius for moral and physical support. What it does suggest is that the venture had plainly escalated out of control and that he had to send to Claudius for reinforcements.” From this and Dio, it would seem that Plautius made his position defensive, which would mean a fort or forts of some substance. Archaeology has to date failed to either locate or define where these where. And while London, or Londinium became the imperial capital of the island, that was several years in the future. How far Plautius ranged from the original crossing is not mentioned but the suggestion is that it was not far, however, it remains a possibility that he could have fortified the site that was to become Londinium. There might be some clues from the layout of Roman roads, but once again, academics do not agree about the course of 1st century roads, and at this time, they might not have yet existed. At the same time, it maybe that as part of Plautius’ fortifications and defences he instigated the construction of the roads leading to the Thames crossing from Kent. There is archaeological evidence for a fort within Roman London, at Cripplegate, but it has been attributed to the early 2nd century and as quarters for the governor’s guards (Singulares). Similarly, London Bridge was the original location for the Roman bridge over the Thames, but it too was of later date and although it would be convenient for the bridge to have formed the crossing for Claudius when he arrived, there is no case to be made. The hiatus is also difficult to resolve with certainty. Paulius had accepted the submissions of several British tribes since his initial landing(s) and they continued to submit after the battle to cross the river Thames while others continued the resistance. It maybe that he sought reinforcements from the continental mainland, or it might have been that he had prior instructions to halt his advance at some strategic point in order to inform Claudius, so that he could make an imperial event of the march to, and conquest of Camulodunum (Colchester) which was the headquarters of Caratacus and his sphere of influence in the south-east. Frere (Britannia) says that word was sent to the Emperor at the beginning of July, and that Claudius arrived about mid-August, this is about six weeks, not very long if the request was unexpected, and if the required reinforcements were to be found and marched to the Channel ports. Frere also says that Plautius withdrew to the southern banks of the Thames during this time, which seems both un-necessary if local tribes had given their submission, and if they had not, then the prospect of once more having to force a crossing, this time under the critical eye of his Emperor would have been a daunting prospect indeed.
by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton |
I’m married to David and we have two daughters, Debbie born in June ’88 and Abigail, born in August ’90. Also in the family are a black and white cat called Socks, a chocolate Labrador Retriever, Rosie, and a Border Terrier called Jake.