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Apart from Caesars comments regarding there being four tribes with their own rulers in Cantiaci we know very little about the peoples living in the area during the years between the invasions of Caesar and Claudius.

(Caesar De Bello Gallico v.22) “… Cassivellaunus sent messages to Cantium, a country by the sea, as above set forth, over whose four districts Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax ruled as kings………”

In the book ‘The Cantiaci’, Alec Detsicas states that the Cantiaci area formed part of a larger region centred on the Thames and stretching as far north as the East Anglia Rivers, west to the Chiltern ridge and south to the High Weald of Kent and Sussex. In this area were five main tribal groups – the Catuvellauni, Cantiaci, Coritani, Iceni and Trinovantes.  

We do not know the exact territories of these peoples — we can only plot these by looking at the distribution of coins issued by the individual rulers to ascertain their political influence and by archaeological fieldwork and interpretation.

When Caesar departed he had imposed terms on the British tribes  – payment of tributes were fixed to ensure that the terms of the treaties were adhered to.  In addition Cassivellaunus of the Catuvellaunian area was forbidden to molest the Trinovantes to his east. 

Caesar tells us that hostages were given – current opinion is that these were not ‘hostages’ in the true sense but were future client kings / sons of kings who were willing to go to Rome and were then educated in the Roman way of life before returning to Britain. 

This is given credence by the fact that Suetonius tells us the following in his De Vita Caesarum–Divus Augustus – The Lives of the Caesars–The Deified Augustus:

XLVIII. Except in a few instances he restored the kingdoms of which he gained possession by the right of conquest to those from whom he had taken them or joined them with other foreign nations. He also united the kings with whom he was in alliance by mutual ties, and was very ready to propose or favour intermarriages or friendships among them. He never failed to treat them all with consideration as integral parts of the empire, regularly appointing a guardian for such as were too young to rule or whose minds were affected, until they grew up or recovered; and he brought up the children of many of them and educated them with his own. 

During the expansion of the Roman Empire it was normal practice for alliances to be formed with their neighbours and in some cases Roman troops being temporarily or permanently garrisoned in these neighbouring territories where Client Kings had been established.  

Whilst we do not have any concrete evidence of this in Britain, some sites have been identified where the archaeological evidence could be interpreted as showing pre conquest occupation.

An example is what appears to be a small Roman Military fort at Gosbecks near Colchester where the rounded corners going under the Late Iron Age Heath Farm Dyke seems to suggest that the fort pre dates the dyke

Settlements

In the South East in particular there was a rapid development into urbanised civilisation – a number of the earlier Iron Age hill forts went into decline although some such as Bigbury, near Canterbury were re-defended.  The Belgae from Northern France who had emigrated here from around 100BC mainly founded the peoples of the area – they tended to form political units, which had less need of forts.  These hill-forts were replaced by the foundation of Oppidum sited on large areas of low lying ground (approx.75-100 acres), defined by linking of natural features and discontinuous great dykes. 

They served a variety of functions – Oppidum are characterized by their mints and from foreign pottery finds which appear in abundance. The locations of these Oppidum were situated on the trade routes needed for distribution and marketing. The Oppidum were also centres for seats of government. However Oppidum still remain poorly understood and evidence is limited  

Some of the settlements thought to be Oppidum in the South East can be identified as:

DVROVERNVM CANTIACORVM (Canterbury) 

The pre-Roman settlement had an oppidum at this crossing place on the River Stour with direct access to the sea through the Stour Estuary.  Belgic Rectangular huts and drainage gullies have been found on both sides of the River Stour 

DVROBRIVAE (Rochester) 

Pre-Roman native settlement on the Medway. Coin moulds have been found 

QUARRY ROAD,  Loose (near Maidstone) 

Possible Belgic oppidum, Quarry Wood, Shepway, TQ 766 516 – controlled the crossing of the Medway
link to multimap arial photo of the area

Other main Oppidum in the larger area  are:

VERULAMIUM  (St Albans) 

The Catuvellauni established a settlement centre and associated dykes on the plateau south of the River Ver. The earthworks can be seen in a simple form at Beech bottom dyke and Devils dyke.

CAMULODUNUM (Colchester) 

The earthworks here enclose a territory of some 12 square miles and appear to run from river valley to river valley. The focal point of the site was a large farmstead within a trapezoidal shaped area in the Gosbecks area. To the north but also within the earthworks is the Sheepen area by the river which was a manufacturing area including a coin mint and workshops. Fragments on coin moulds have been recovered from the area.  

Trade

The time between the Julian and Claudian invasions was a time of turmoil and unrest, which opened up new markets for trade particularly in Slaves. 

In the Cantiaci region trade links with the Roman world had been in place since the 1st century BC using Gallo-Belgic coinage as well as the more locally produced potin coinage of North Kent.  

The previous Atlantic route between the South East Coast at locations such as Hengistbury Head in Dorset with Southern Gaul and the Mediterranean was virtually replaced by the more direct route between Northern Gaul, the Mediterranean world and southeast England following the Veneti revolt in BC 56 when Caesar defeated the Veneti fleet.

Trade was expanding in this area – from the middle of the first century BC, Roman merchandise was steadily being brought into the region due to intensified contacts bringing about changes in the lifestyle of the Cantiaci inhabitants.

Imports consisted of amphorae, pottery fine wares from Gaul, Germany and the Mediterranean, glassware, bronze vessels and silver cups. The exports were more primitive consisting of basic raw materials and agricultural produce and show clearly the difference between an under-developed country and a more progressive one.

Amphorae  

The alliance which was forged between Rome and the Trinovantes after Caesar appears to have also led to an increase in trade – Large numbers of Amphorae have been found on many sites in Hertfordshire and Essex as well as in other areas such as the oppidum at Bagendon near Chichester. 

The amphorae contained wine as well as olives, nuts or other as products such as garum – a fish sauce which comes from the southern Spanish coastal region. The main types of Amphorae found in the South East are the Dressel 1B form – numerous kilns sites for the production of these have been found in Italy and the Richborough 527 type, which were probably made in the Eolie Islands off the coast of Sicily.

Politics and Power

There appears to be two distinctive dynasties in the South East  – The Commian dynasty centred on the south and Tasciovanian in the east north of the Thames.

Commius had fled to Britain after the rebellion in Gaul where he had been involved in the rebel movement with Vercingetorix  – from coins found in Sussex and Hampshire it appears likely that he established a kingdom in that area. These coins have ‘COMMIUS’ on them and are known as British Q coins. His son Tincommius may have had a formal treaty with Augustus. The earlier coins Tincommius produced were identical in style to those of Commius – these showed head and horse imagery. The coins he later produced in Sussex and Hampshire are more romanised in style.  

His two brothers Eppilus and Verica plotted against Tincommius and he fled to Rome hoping to enlist the help of Augustus with no success.

In C AD 15 the younger brother Verica ousted Eppilus – Eppilus escaped to Kent where he also ejected the king Dubnovellaunos. Dubnovellaunos had been the first Cantiaci king to issue inscribed coins – mainly in a ‘Celtic’ style with ‘DVBNOVELLAV’ inscribed on them. These coins are found over a large area centred on oppidum at Durobrivae (modern day Rochester)

Tasciovanus may have been the son or grandson of Cassivellaunus and was the first Catuvellaunian leader to issue coins inscribed with his name and a mintmark from Verulamium. [VER c.20BC]

Tasciovanus started a period of expansion against the Trinovantes in direct contravention of the Treaty and coins bearing his name are found with the mintmark of CAMV (Camulodum) showing he had taken over the Trinovantes capital for a period before retreating.

On his death his son Cunobelin succeeded him. In AD9 the Romans suffered a massive disaster in the Tuetoberger Forest in Germany when three legions under Varus were massacred – Cunobelin possibly invaded the territory of the Trinovantes when it was unlikely that Augustus was in a position to retaliate.

Cunobelin is found minting coins in gold, silver and bronze, not from the Catuvellaunian capital at Verulamium but from Camulodunum.

This policy of expansionism continued with most of Kent and beyond the Thames into the Atrebate territory being dominated by Cunobelin. Despite this apparent hostility overseas trade continued to expand in this region. Cunobelin who reigned for nearly 30 years appears to have achieved such a position of power that he was described by Suetonius as ‘Rex Britannorum’ . He was obviously a great statesman and maintained a balanced kingdom, which he brought to a peak of Romanisation.

Cunobelin is thought to have died shortly before the AD 43 invasions – from coin evidence it seems his territory had already been divided between his sons, Adminius, Caratacus and Togodumnus. The political situation changed rapidly after Cunobelins death as both Caratacus and Togodumnus adopted a policy of hostility towards Rome.  

Adminius who held pro-Roman views might have had his base on the extremity of North East Kent, which included the only, land locked harbour and the Wansum Channel. He was driven from Cantium by Cunobelin before his death and fled to Gauis who was campaigning in Germany.

Togodumnus took over his father’s kingdom and Caratacus began a calculated campaign of invasion to the lands of Verica and the Atrebates – Verica fled to Rome seeking the help of Claudius.

Matters had become out of hand – The southeast area had changed from being a region, which operated under a client kingship where Rome was the overlord. 

This region had enjoyed the benefits and commerce of the Empire for a number of generations. Caratacus and Togodumnus had created political unrest and an unstable situation with no clear successor to Cunobelin. This threatened the trade which was inextricably linked to Rome

The forthcoming invasion may have been initially to secure the Catuvellauni territory rather than an invasion of Britain itself.

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

In 58BC the province of Transalpine Gaul was assigned to Caesar – the area included Northern France, Southern Holland, Belgium, Germany west of the Rhine and most of Switzerland.  

 In his commentaries, Caesar described the area and the peoples of Gaul as such:

Caes.gal.1.1″: [1.1]

“All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are called Celts, in our Gaul’s, the third. All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gaul’s from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are furthest from the civilization and refinement of [our] Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them, and import those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war; for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gaul’s in valor, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage war on their frontiers.

One part of these, which it has been said that the Gaul’s occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone; it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae; it borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches toward the north.  The Belgae rises from the extreme frontier of Gaul extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and look toward the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun, and the North Star.”  

Strabo’s account (Strabo IV.iv. 2,4) also says the whole race is madly keen on war, brave and impetuous and easily outwitted. Because of their frankness and straightforwardness their sympathies are easily roused to war in support of friends who think themselves wronged.

Caesar fought a bloody war to bring these lands and their tribes under his control, which lasted about a year, but spent the next six years fighting a number of rebellions before his conquest of Gaul could be considered to be complete. Caesar, fortunately for us, recorded these in his Bellum Gallicom, which was his own account of the Gallic Wars.

Helveti  

In the spring of 58bc the tribe of the Helvetia who lived in the area of modern Switzerland decided to emigrate en masse into western Gaul. There were only two routes they could have taken – one between the Jura Mountains and the Rhone which was too narrow for wagons to pass through easily – the other through the Roman province. The Helvetia requested permission from Caesar to cross this area – he rather deceitfully told them he would consider their request while at the same time ordered as many fresh troops as possible from throughout the province. When the Helvetia envoys arrived to see Caesar on the appointed day he told them they could not cross the Roman province and that if they tried to use force he would stop them.

The only other alternative the Helvetia had was to go through the territory of the Aedui. In “Caes.gal.1.11”: it states:

“The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands.”

The Aedui sent ambassadors to Caesar requesting help – Caesar heard that three parts of the Helvetii tribes had crossed the River Saone. He set off with three legions and attacked the rest who were still to cross the river – they were laden with baggage and surprised by his attack. Many were slain and the remainder fled to hide in the woods. Caesar then built a bridge over the river and pursued the Helvetia for some time before engaging them in battle where they were defeated. It is telling in Caesar’s commentaries the ruthlessness of his army – the following shows the number of Helvetia who had begun the emigration march compared to the 110,000 who Caesar sent home following the battle.  

Caes.gal.1.29″: [1.29]  

“In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was: 

Of the Helvetii [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii]	263,000
Of the Tulingi	36,000
Of the Latobrigi	14,000
Of the Rauraci	23,000
Of the Boii	32,000
The sum of all amounted to	368,000

Veneti

The Veneti on the southern coast of Brittany were a maritime power with strong and extensive trading links to Britain. Their towns were built on promontories, which were difficult to reach by land. In 56bc they rebelled against Caesar by taking prisoner Roman soldiers who had been sent out to procure corn, then captured the envoys sent out to rescue them and demanded that their own hostages be returned to them.  

Caesar ordered ships of war to be built on the River Loire and for rowers, sailors and pilots to be provided.

He knew details of the style of the Veneti ships, which he describes as follows:

“Caes.gal.3.13”:

The keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows were raised very high, and, in like manner the sterns were adapted to the force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence whatever; the benches which were made of planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man’s thumb; the anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for sails they used skins and thin dressed leather.

The battle and the Roman victory that followed are well documented in Cassius Dio Book XXXIX

It is worth noting that Strabo (IV.iv.1) believes that Caesar intended to invade Britain in 56bc and that the reason for the Venetic revolt was to hinder Caesar’s voyage to Britain and to protect their trade there.

Britons had come to the attention of Caesar during his battles with the Gaul’s – he knew that some Britons had crossed the channel to provide military aid. According to Caes gal 4.20, it says ‘ he discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gaul’s succors had been furnished to our enemy from that country’

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

This is our version of the Invasions based on what we have read and our own  interpretation.

Having said that, I find my thoughts on this subject  are ever changing. I think its very important to be open-minded and ever questioning and not to just accept what we have been told in our education or read in a book and that the debate should continue.

Previous archaeological findings are being challenged on locations of landings, historical evidence is often being rewritten or re-assessed – I doubt that until (if ever) concrete archaeological evidence of landing sites is discovered that ‘educated’ guesswork is all we can hope for.

I have enjoyed working with Richard on this project – its been fun, educational, frustrating, and time consuming. Without Richards total commitment and determination I could not have completed this on my own.  My heartfelt thanks to you Richard.

Responsible Metal Detecting – Helping to uncover Archaeology
Coinage Home coins roman 1&2 C roman 3&4 C emperors monarchs		Kings and Queens of England (Many thanks to all those who have provided images for use on this page) The ruling house of Wessex, the line of Cerdic through to Alfred (the Great). Cerdic 519 – 534 Cynric 534 – 560 Ceawlin 560 – 592 Ceola 592 – 597 Ceolwulf 597 – 611 Cyniglis 611 – 642 Cenwealh 642 – 672 Aescwine 673 – 676 Centwine 676 – 686 Ceadwalla 686 – 688 Ine 688 – 726 Aethelheard 726 – 740 Cuthred 740 – 756 Sigeberht 756 – 757 Cynewulf 757 – 786 Brihtric 786 – 802 Ecgberht of Wessex 802 – 839 Aethelwulf 839 – 858 Aethelbald 858 – 860 Ethelbert 860 – 866 Ethelred 866 – 871 Alfred 871 – 899 Viewed by most as the first real king of a real country of England, his line continued through to Edward the Confessor, of which line more later. Alfred silver penny Here therefore are some of the rulers of other English regions, in no particular order other than chronology. Edwine king of Northumbria. (?-638) Oswald king of Northumbria. (?-642) Eric Blood-axe king of Northumbria (reigned 948 and 952-954 ) Eric Blood-axe -a penny of the 2nd reign. Penda king of Mercia. c580-655 Offa king of Mercia (reigned 757-796) Offa penny Coenwulf of Mercia 798 AD – 821 AD Coenwulf Penny Baldred king of Kent 823-825 Baldred penny Cuthred king of Kent 798-807 Cuthred penny Continuation of the line of Alfred: Edward the Elder 899 – 924 Athelstan 924 – 939 Edmund 939 – 946 Edmund Penny Eadred 946 – 955 Eadred Silver penny Eadwig the All-Fair 955 – 959 Edgar the Peaceable 959 – 975 Edgar half penny Edward the Martyr 975 – 978 Aethelred II 978 – 1016 Aethelred II penny Sweyn ? – 1014 Canute 1016 – 1035 Cnut Penny Edmund Ironside 1016 Harold Harefoot 1035 – 1040 Harold I silver penny Harthacanut 1040 – 1042 Harthacnut cut halfpenny Edward the Confessor 1042 – 1066 Edward the Confessor Penny. Pointed helmet type Since the Norman conquest, coins have been struck for every reign (except that of Lady Jane Grey), but some, those of Edward V and Edward VIII, in particular, are very rare. Harold (II) Godwineson 1066 Harold II cut halfpenny William of Normandy 1066 – 1087 William I a penny William II Rufus 1087 – 1100 Henry I 1100 – 1135 Stephen (1135-54) Stephen penny Matilda the Empress d 1167 claimed the throne during the reign of Stephen 1135 – 1154 Henry II 1154 – 1189 Henry II penny Richard I Coeur de Lion 1189 – 1199 Richard I penny John (Lackland) 1199 – 1216 King John 3rd coinage Dublin mint, moneyer Roberd. Henry III 1216 – 1272 Henry III penny Edward I 1272 – 1307 Edward I Penny Edward II 1307 – 1358 Edward II penny Bury St Edmunds Edward III 1358 – 1377 Edward III penny London Richard II 1377 – 1399 Richard II York Mint – clipped silver penny Henry IV 1399 – 1413 Henry IV halfpenny Henry V 1413 – 1422 HenryV Penny Henry VI reigned 1422-1461 and 1470-1471 Henry VI – a groat of the first reign Edward IV reigned 1461-1470 and 1471-1483 Edward V 1483 Richard III 1483 – 1485 Henry VII 1485 – 1509 Henry VIII 1509 – 1547 Henry VIII half-sovereign Edward VI 1547 – 1553 died young Edward VI Half crown Jane Grey the nine day queen Mary I 1553 – 1558 Mary Silver Groat Elizabeth I 1558 – 1603 James I, and VI 1603 – 1625 James I halfpenny Charles I 1625 – 1649 Beheaded Charles 1st half crown Interregnum 1649 – 1660? Commonwealth under Cromwell Commonwealth Shilling Charles II 1660 – 1685 James II 1685 – 1688 James II Shilling William (III) and Mary 1688 – 1702 – Mary died 1694 William III shilling Anne 1702 – 1714 Anne Shilling George I 1714 – 1727 George I Shilling George II 1727 – 1760 George II shilling George III 1760 – d1820 George III 3rd of a Guinea George IV 1820 – 1830 George IV sovereign William IV 1830 – 1837 William IV Half crown Victoria 1837 – 1901 Edward VII 1901 – 1910 Edward VII half sovereign George V 1910 – 1936 George V Half crown Edward VIII 1936 Abdicated before coronation George VI 1936 – 1952 George VI Half crown Elizabeth II 1952 – Elizabeth II sovereign
Designed by Corinne Mills 2005 email [email protected]

After the abortive, and militarily embarrassing events of the previous year, Julius Caesar re-grouped his forces, re-thought his strategy and tactics, and determined to recover some of his dented credibility with another attempt at a landing in Britain. The only sources available, are Classical ones, as stated previously, no records exist from the British viewpoint. It is a well-known phenomenon, that the overall victors are the ones who write the history, in this event only the Roman perspective has come down to us. The veracity therefore of the Classical chronicles, has to be suspect, as has been evidenced by so many revelations about another empire, ironically, the British, which have shown, that there is always another side to every coin. This, together with an almost none-existent archaeological record provides little with which to work. It would be easy to copy verbatim, those same chronicles, and say – this was so – it might not have been so at all, but it is all we have, that, and some insight, and it has to be said, some speculation. 

The first clue to the events of 54B.C. are from Cassius Dio, who in his book XL he states that Caesar “among other undertakings constructed ships of a style half-way between his own swift vessels and the native ships of burden (trading vessels), endeavoring to make them at once as light and as seaworthy as possible and capable of being left high and dry without injury.” This indicates the intention for the ships be capable of being beached, thereby reducing the threat of them being lost to wind and sea while at anchor. It also points to a major military enterprise, the organisation, and logistics required to construct, from scratch, an entire fleet would have been prodigious. Indeed, according to Caesar’s Gallic Wars 5.2, it says “When he arrived there (the army camped on the north shores of Gaul), having made a survey of the winter quarter, he finds that, by the extraordinary ardour (hard work) of the soldiers, amid the utmost scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described above and twenty eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from that state, that they might be launched in a few days.” The ships, as described in this work, were according to this text “For the dispatch (speed) of lading (loading), and for drawing them on shore, he makes them a little lower (shallower draught) than those which we have been accustomed to use in our sea (the Mediterranean); and that so much more, because he knew that, on account of the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the purpose of transporting burdens and a great number of horses, (they were to be) a little broader (wider in the beam) than those which we use in other seas.” It seems, from this, that the invasion fleet, which it has to be viewed as, were of a type of vessel, especially designed for the purpose of transporting a very large body of troops and all their horses, plus equipment and baggage, to a potentially hostile shore, in tidal conditions and unpredictable weather. 

This was no opportunist raid, as 55B.C. may be seen as, this was to be a full sea-bourn invasion. There is, as far as is known, no surviving evidence, archaeological, or otherwise, as to the actual appearance of any of this huge fleet. By the time the repaired vessels of the previous expedition, and private vessels of officers were included, the fleet numbered approximately 800 ships. In order to try and establish the numbers of soldiers employed on this expedition, we are told that there were 2,000 cavalry, if one assumes a minimum of 20 horses to a ship, this accounts for approximately 100 ships. The remaining 700, were manned mainly by soldiers, it seems, therefore, if we again assume a minimum of 50 soldiers to each vessel, on average, then a total number of 35,000 men would appear to be the smallest number required, although no figures are anywhere indicated, there could well have been considerably more. The argument for this force to be larger than 35,000 men is a strong one, because when the four legions under the command of Aulus Plautius landed in 43 A.D., the total number of men has been estimated, and often quoted as being 40,000, and this with one legion less than Julius Caesar.

After some administrative concerns had been dealt with, Caesar was able to concentrate on the project in hand, and according to his own writings, embarked five entire legions and two thousand cavalry, together with, presumably, a substantial quota of Auxiliaries. When the wind and weather were from the appropriate quarter, the fleet set sail, from Boulogne and Port Itius in particular, and possibly other ports on the north Gaulish coast. The night of July 6 is sometimes quoted as being the date of departure, although there is no documentary evidence to support this conjecture. What Caesar describes next, is very telling, and revealing. There has been much debate concerning the actual landing sites for all three landings. This one however, is by far the best described, and leaves little doubt to the area of the landings in Britain, if not the precise location. In Caes.gal.5.8, it states that they “set sail at sunset, and bourn forward by a gentle south-west wind, he was unable to maintain his course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left.” This is quite categorical, what is being described is that the fleet, made considerable leeway, on a tide setting eastward as the wind dropped, this on a roughly northern course, means that the fleet were pushed in the direction of where Dover is today, and beyond. Indeed, for Britain to be on the left, – or port side – means that they had been forced towards the narrows which then separated the mainland from the Isle of Thanet, not the best of places for a landing, with strong tidal currents, tide rips and an uncertain bottom. Instead of Britain being ahead of them, it was to their left, this is a vital clue. Had the tide however set them to the west, then the land would have been on their right (starboard), this therefore has to be excluded as a possibility. However, Caesar seemed aware of both the dangers of his whereabouts, and where he wished to be. At the turn of the tide, and with the aid of their oars (yet another clue to the appearance of the fleet), they altered their course westward. The chronicle continues “Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged them on with the oars, that he might make that part of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer, that there was the best landing place, and in this affair the spirit of the soldiers was very much extolled, for they (the soldiers) with the transports and heavy ships, the labour of rowing not being discontinued, equaled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day:… 

This then provides one answer as to where the landing took place, for if we know the time of year, (July?) and the rate of the tide added to the cruising speed of a Roman galley, and multiply it by the time between sunrise and mid-day, it gives us a distance. From current records, a mean tidal flow rate of ebb/flood tides in the Dover area, is about 70cm per second, which, multiplied up, is roughly 15 kilometers (see : http://www.shom.fr/fr_page/fr_act_geo/TPlidierleb.html ) over six hours between sunrise and mid-day. The maximum speed of war galleys under oars was about 10 – 12k per hour, this however was not maintainable for any length of time, and a cruising speed over the water of this fleet of about 3 – 4k per hour seems more reasonable. Given that the majority of the troops had landed by mid-day, a rowing time of 4 hours would provide a reasonable estimate. This gives us a figure of about 30k, from the point at which the fleet changed it’s course. If they had reached as far north as the area around Sandwich, then, measuring back, this places the landing site somewhere close to the present-day Folkestone. 

Certainly, from the South Foreland light east of Dover, to the western extremity of East Wear Bay, any kind of landing is very unlikely, as this is where the Chalk cliffs of the North Downs drop perpendicularly into the sea. To the west of the Folkestone area, were the Romney Marshes, not the best terrain for military maneuverings, nor does it fit any of the descriptions mentioned in the texts. Next west is the headland of Dungeness, a place also unsuitable for a sea-bourn assault. Anywhere further west similarly, does not fit in with Caesar’s description. It may be no coincidence that Folkestone, was the eastern end of the ancient British trackway known as the North Downs Trackway, which would have been vital for moving large numbers of troops into the British hinterland.

Theorised routes of channel crossing

At this point, is seems appropriate to explain a little about the legions of Caesar. The texts show that each was known by a number at this time, and may have had either official, or, unofficial titles, however, their composition was well established, regardless of some minor adjustments. A Caesarian legion was composed of about 5,000 men, organised into 10 Cohorts, of 500 men each. Legions had an assortment of officers, many of which were political appointments. The Legate, who had nominal command, while under him, were the Tribunes, of which the usual number was 6, these were the military commanders. The legion standard, the Aquila, or ‘Eagle,’ was carried by the Aquilifer. Each cohort was divided into 6 Centuries of 80 men, and each Century had it’s own Centurion in command, with an Optio as his back-up, each had it’s own standard, the Signum, carried by the Signifer, and a trumpeter, called a Cornicen, the trumpets being almost circular in design. Another officer allotted to each Century was the Tesserarius, who’s primary role was concerned with guard duties. There was a small cavalry element attached to each legion, but they served mainly as scouts, and dispatch riders.

The cavalry, as employed by Caesar in 54A.D. were likely, either Gallic or Germanic auxiliaries organised into units called Alae each having a strength of 500 men. Each Alae was divided into 16 Turmae of 32 officers and men. This is by necessity, simplistic, and there are many works that discuss this aspect of military life in pre-empire times in considerably more detail.

The ‘normal’ appearance of a Roman legionary, the common foot-soldier, had yet to make an appearance, although their weapons were the all familiar Gladius (short stabbing sword) Pilum (javelin with soft metal head designed to bend on penetrating impact either on shield, horse, or man, in order to kill, wound or hamper the movements of the unfortunate recipient.) The shield, oval at this period, was called a Scutum, while helmets were of an almost conical design in some cases, round in others with descending cheek guards and simpler to the later well known types, any crests were likely to have been horse hair plumes. The body armour was a tunic of mail, rather than the almost ubiquitous Lorica Segmentata, the hooped metal plate armour of later periods, also lacking seems to have been the studded leather straps which protected the groin area.

These then were the legionaries who disembarked onto what they feared would be a hostile shore. However, the British, who had gathered together under a single war chief, a man called Cassivellaunus who was ricon – or king of the Catuvellauni people who’s domain reached from the northern banks of the river Thames into the current Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire. According to Caesar, who’s account it is now necessary to follow, after seeing the quantity of ships landing troops, the watching Britons, located on the hills and cliffs overlooking the landing beaches, retreated. It may be however, that those were a scouting party, sent to determine where the Romans had landed, and – once seeing them ashore – departed to report to their king. Once ashore, a suitable location was found for the construction of a camp – it is unfortunate that no archaeological evidence for this place has been discovered, for it would resolve once and for all, where, exactly, this event took place. The fleet, he left at anchor, under the guardianship of ten cohorts, possibly two from each legion, and three hundred cavalry, who, it must be assumed, secured the camp, and the beachhead. It means that nearly 6,000 men were left to guard the ships, and the beach, which would be required to land them on, should the weather once again prove to be dangerous. The idea of leaving the fleet at anchor, knowing how treacherous the weather could be, suggests that Caesar was concerned that the British might be tempted to attack the camp, and if possible burn the ships, which would have left him and his army totally isolated. Safer therefore to leave them at anchor for as long as possible, and only beach them under the direst of meteorological threats. Caesar left Quintus Atrius in command of the guard, and the fleet. According to Caesar’s account, the army then proceeded to advance in the direction taken by the retreating British for a distance of twelve miles, where he says, they saw the enemy, advancing towards ‘the river.’ This river is assumed to be the river Stour, and this, geographically, is difficult to rationalise, as there is no part of the southern Kent coast that lies within a twelve-mile radius of that river. If the Folkestone area was the landing site, then it may be assumed, that the British would have retreated along the ‘North Down’s Trackway’, which terminated close to that site. The other, often quoted landing place is Deal, north of Dover, this location suffers from the same inconsistency of geography, being almost equidistant from Bigbury, as the proposed Folkestone site. It is logical also to assume, that in order to move over 30,000 men, such a track-way would be necessary for any kind of rapid advance. As the legions climbed the heights of the North Downs, the British commenced what can only be described as hit and run tactics, harrying the legions using their cavalry and chariots. Of any river crossing, Caesar makes no mention at this point, so maybe, it was of small military importance, he continues to say however, that the British had refortified what can only have been a hill-fort. Theories abound, but it seems generally accepted, that the site of this fort was at Bigbury, just west of the present day Canterbury. Of the fort Caesar says this “they concealed themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war, for all the entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees.” This describes a place that had been prepared in advance, a place where some consideration had been given to either delaying, or halting the Roman progress. Warriors were also hidden in the woods close by, from which they sallied forth to defend the fort’s entrances. Resistance was valiant – if futile – the soldiers of the 7th legion formed a testudo – or tortoise, then threw up a rampart against the fort’s defences. The testudo, was a formation of men in close order which were able to use their shields to make an impenetrable shell for the whole number of men enclosed. The interlocked shields covered the front, sides, rear, and top of the formation. This now familiar tactic, was revolutionary to the British, they had no clue how to either attack it, or defend against it. Having breached the fort’s defences, the battle was virtually over, after some sporadic fighting, the British withdrew, leaving it in the possession of the successful 7th legion, who suffered, but few casualties. Caesar then refortified the site to Roman specifications, and settled his army down within its earthen walls and ramparts for a well deserved rest. The following morning, in an attempt to discover in which direction the British had withdrawn, the column was divided into three, and ordered to scour the countryside for any sign of them. It was not long before the stragglers of the British were found, but at about the same time, messages were received at Caesar’s headquarters, that disaster had, once again, hit the fleet of anchored ships. A storm had arisen during the previous night, and damaged or destroyed many of the ships. Quintus Atrius reported by messenger that most of the fleet had been sunk, or badly damaged. After Caesar’s experience of 55B.C., he was nervous about this news, it was, most likely, the worst thing that could befall the expedition. The columns were immediately recalled, and he personally returned to the beachhead to find out the exact extent of the damage. It was not as bad as he feared, about forty ships had been lost, and many others damaged, but mostly, not beyond repair. Orders were issued to selected workmen from the legions to set about repairing those ships which could be repaired, and a message was sent back across the Channel – to Labenius – to instigate the rapid construction of as many more new ships as could be produced by the legions he had with him on the Continent to replace those lost. He then ordered all the still floating ships to be hauled ashore, for their future security. It was a massive task to ask of his legionaries, as it was necessary also to extend the fortified camp on the shore to include all the soon to be beached vessels. It took ten days, and nights, of unremitting labour to complete the whole endeavour, after which the fleet was safely beached behind extended and reinforced fortifications. Such a strongly defended position would, one assumes, have left at least some archaeological evidence, but to date, nothing of it has been found. It might be that the site has in the intervening two millennia, been eroded away, and has fallen into the sea. This argues against the Folkestone site, as, the land there has in fact extended from the Roman shore, and, it would by now be a considerable distance inland. Where ever the site was, Caesar left the same ten cohorts and cavalry to defend the beach, and set off back to Bigbury fort where the Britons had taken advantage of the hiatus to regroup, reinforce, re-organise, and re-think their tactics. It has to be said here, that Caesar’s Gallic Wars, as helpful as it maybe, can also be unhelpful too. The next part of his narrative speaks of several encounters between the two forces, but lacks any indication as to location. All he says is this and that occurred at ‘the camp,’ though whether this was still Bigbury camp, or later marching camps, remains a unresolved. Logic dictates, that he was referring to marching camps, as his column advanced into the lands of the Cantiaci. As there is also made mention of ‘miles’ as a distance, this needs to be defined. A Roman mile, or mille passuum, was a distance of 1,000 paces measured at 5 feet per pace. This means a Roman mile was 5,000 feet, as opposed to 5,280 feet in the British Statute mile, and compares with the kilometre of 1.48 per Roman mile. It has also been suggested that a Roman legion could march between 15 and 30 m.p. a day. This would depend heavily on the terrain, and the access to their own paved roads, or lack of them.

Cassivellaunus, as said, had been made overall war leader of the British tribes, this would not have sat very well with several of them, as leader of the Catuvellauni he had been responsible for the overpowering of many of the disaffected tribes, their homeland was north and west of the River Thames, although their influence spread much further, and it might have been Cassivellaunus’s own personality which enabled the temporary alliance between tribes, because such a concept of cooperation was not alien to their way of life. Spies and informants reported some of this to Caesar as his army advanced west into Kent, and north towards the Thames. His intention may have been to take, capture, or kill Cassivellaunus, and thereby removing in one fell swoop, the resistance of the tribes. What ever his motives, Caesar had to find a ford across the heavily tidal river Thames. It was during the advance when, after an un-successful raid by British chariots, and cavalry, that an over zealous section of Romans chased too far, and consequently became isolated from the main column, Caesar reports several deaths as a result. Another encounter was at the site of a marching camp where engineers, engaged in fortifying the camp, were unexpectedly attacked by a large force of British. Two cohorts were sent as reinforcements, but they, being from different legions, did not form a close enough unit, which allowed the British to engage the gap between the cohorts, and thereby make their escape. The death of Quintus Laberius Durus, a tribune, was reported. Caesar says at this point “In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took place under the eyes and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the weight of their arms, in as much as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse [cavalry] also fought with great danger, because the [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat, and to those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed [in different parts]; and then one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded [replaced] the wearied.” The day after the above events there occurred yet another attack while the legionaries had been instructed to do some foraging. The attack came from all quarters, and even got within striking distance of the revered legionary eagles. The danger to their eagles might have been the spur required for the legions to regroup, and after awaiting the arrival of the cavalry arm a counter attack was made with great success. So great was the victory, that afterwards, any attacks that were made were puny in comparison, and of small account. The allied tribes however had not been defeated, they had withdrawn to yet another fortified line of defence, the River Thames. This seems quite unequivocal Caes Gal 5.18 states “Caesar, having discovered their design, leads his army into the territory of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames which river can be forded in one place only, and that with difficulty.” This now poses the question, how did Caesar know it was the river Thames – was it the same waterway as that known today? In order to check this it is necessary to venture into the original Latin text – which says – ‘flumen Tamesim’ – river Tamesem, when then, and from where did the Tamesem part come from? According to a dictionary of English place names it says ‘ Thames – Tamesis 51B.C. An ancient Celtic river name possibly meaning ‘dark one’ or simply ‘river’’. Which means that the river Thames could actually mean – river River !! If this is so – then the finite acceptance that Caesar did cross the Thames may not be finite at all.

It has been suggested that the Thames had several crossing points, not bridges, but fords, or causeways. Locations for these fords have been proposed, they include, Battersea, Brentford, and Westminster, all of which have been verified as possible fords by archaeologists. The Westminster site seems to be the current favourite. There was an extension of the later built Watling Street which appears to have crossed the river in that location, and there is evidence of an island off the northern bank which has been called Thorney, and it has to be said, that Caesar also mentions ‘alteram fluminis ripam’ – a second river bank, which would have to be assaulted in the case of a ford at this point. However, it must be pointed out that all this is conjecture, and the locations of roman crossing places of the Thames is still a hotly debated topic amongst academics.

The Britons had very likely, by means of false information lead Caesar to the desired ford because when the legions approached the south bank, the opposite bank was lined with a great multitude of warriors and the river banks had been fortified with stakes embedded into the ground, some above water, some below. Caesar did not hesitate long and dispatched his cavalry across the river, and then ordered forward his legions in support. The defences were not very effective, and the Romans landed in relative safety immediately falling upon the enemy. Likely surprised by the ease with which the Romans had crossed the barrier of the river, the British quickly lost heart, and made their escapes as best they could. Cassivellaunus was able to retain control of over 4,000 chariots, and, as they withdrew into their own heartland, they drove before them all the cattle and people, thereby depriving the advancing legions of plunder, slaves, and food stocks. The cavalry were instructed, after several sorties had been ambushed, not to venture too far from the relative security of the legions. The defeat of Cassivellaunus at the Thames seems to have been the catalyst for a more general revolt of his self imposed authority. Several disaffected tribes began to make embassies to Caesar, premier among them was Mandubratius of the Trinovantes who’s father had been slain by Cassivellaunus. The offer to surrender them selves to Rome, rather than endure the dominance of other Britons might appear a strange thing to do. It could be however, that the prospect of peace and security, under the umbrella of Rome was more appealing than their own British heritage, a concept, which may not have then been apparent to them. In exchange for their promised loyalty, the tribes invited Caesar to install a Roman dignitary to oversee their protection and interests from a vengeful Cassivellaunus, a Roman who by his simple presence would hopefully deter any incursions into Trinovantian lands. Caesar readily agreed, but added the provisos that forty hostages be handed over, and his army be provided with as much corn as they required. Once the negotiations had been completed between Caesar and the Trinobantes, other tribes soon followed suit. Those named by Caesar were the Cenemagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, all of which sent embassies to Caesar. It was – it is said – from these embassies that Caesar learned of the location of the ‘command centre’ of Cassivellaunus, and that it was not far from his present location.

While these events had been happening north of the Thames, to the south of that river, Cassivellaunus had used what remained of his authority with those tribes still loyal to him, those who’s kings were called Cingetorix, Carvillius, Taximagulus and Segonax to rally their warriors, and assemble them ready for an all out attack on the fortified landing site and beached fleet of ships, which were Caesar’s sole line of communication with Gaul. Likely as a result of an uncoordinated attack by the rival British kings, they were soon defeated with heavy losses, to such a degree that news of the disaster was immediately sent north to Cassivellaunus. He however, had trouble enough of his own to contend with. Caesar had discovered the whereabouts of his main camp, which had been fortified with ditches and earthen walls. Approaches to the camp were made difficult by the proximity of dense woodlands and bog-land. It must have seemed a formidable place to assault. 

It was not however Caesar’s way, to procrastinate, and he launched an attack from two directions, which was decisive. The British fled to an enclave within the camp where “A great many cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.” 

The location of this last stand it has been claimed, was at the earthwork known today as Devil’s Dyke, at Wheathampstead, in Hertfordshire, just north of the later Roman settlement called Verulanium, today called, St. Albans. Evidence of Belgic occupation of the site circa 50 B.C., was discovered by Sir Mortimer Wheeler, when he excavated there in the 1930’s. The ditch has been estimated as being130 feet wide at the top, and 40 feet deep, and though much eroded, much of it’s impressiveness can still be envisaged there today. It may be surmised that this earthwork was linked to another very close by, called the Stad, being as they are, even today almost linked by a wet ditch called The Moat. 

If these three features were combined in 54 B.C. they would have made an enormous rectangular enclosure defended on at least three sides. The northern side, is seemingly open, although it might be possible that any defensive features on this side have been lost. A display board in a local museum says “For at least 100 years before the Roman Conquest in AD 43 this part of Hertfordshire was the heartland of a powerful and aggressive tribe known as Catuvellauni, Celtic for ‘expert warrior’….. The earliest capital of the Catuvellauni is likely to have been at Wheathampstead. ….. Here are massive earthworks known as Devil’s Dyke. ……… This was attacked by Julius Caesar in 54 BC. “

Cassivellaunus, learning of the betrayal of several tribes, the massive defeat on the Kent coast, which added to the devastation of his own lands, and the huge loss of life of his people and his warriors, had no other option but to sue for peace. Though the intermediary, Commius, an Atrebatian, arrangements were made for the hand over of hostages, and the payment of tribute to Rome. Agreement was also extracted for Cassivellaunus not to take revenge, or make war upon either Mandubratius, or the Trinovantes as a whole. News had arrived that revolt had broken out in Gaul, and Caesar was desperate to return there to restore Roman authority. Consequently, subsequent to the reception of the hostages and tribute, the legions made their way back to the waiting fleet, who’s losses had been replaced, and repairs all but completed ready for the embarkation of the army and it’s acquired masses of prisoners. The season too made it imperative that the crossing be made with dispatch, as the equinoctial storms were soon expected, and Caesar needed his legions intact for Gaul. So it was that the Roman army left British shores, not to return for almost a hundred years, a hiatus which was to see many changes, both in Rome, and in Britain. It seems, after this span of time to be an anti-climactic end to such a great endeavour, indeed, from some contemporary commentaries, it seemed so at the time too, as Caesar returned with no grand plunder, and seemingly nothing to show for the entire campaign. His legacy was however to influence British tribal politics for the next hundred years, and for those tribes who had embraced the arrival of the Romans, it began a period of pre-Romanisation, which would eventually lead to historic consequences.

It cannot be over emphasised just how much of the above narrative depends on the writings of Caesar, not an especially unbiased account of things. Much remains speculation, and argument and debate continue amongst academics. Archaeology has yet to prove or disprove most of the above, and, while discoveries are still being made, they remain sparse, and inconclusive.

I came, I saw, I conquered!

As a brief aside, a post-script, and to clarify a minor oft quoted misconception, it is sometimes said that Julius Caesar uttered the immortal words “Veni vedi vici” at the conclusion of his British expeditions of 55 B.C. and 54 B.C. It is necessary here to correct this perceived error which has somehow crept into British historical myth. It was several years after Caesar had turned his army, his thoughts, and his back on the British Isles, when, after the military competition between himself and his rival for control of Rome, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known more generally to history as, Pompey, came to an end with the murder of Pompey in Egypt. His ignoble end came as a result of his army being defeated by that of Caesar’s at the battle of Pharsalia in August, 48 B.C. After a brief dalliance in Alexandria with the Egyptian queen, Cleopatra, his presence was required at the location of a small local disturbance in north-eastern Anatolia where, Pharnaces, king of the Cimmerian Bospherus, in 47 B.C. had taken advantage of Caesar’s pre-occupation in Egypt to try and regain his father’s kingdom of Pontus. Suetonius, writing in c110A.D. says that Caesar “vanquished him in a single battle within five days after his arrival and four hours after getting sight of him” He later continues to describe Caesar’s triumphal return to Rome “In his Pontic triumph he displayed among the show-pieces of the procession an inscription of but three words, “I came, I saw, I conquered,” [ ‘Veni, vidi, vici’] not indicating the events of the war, as the others did, but the speed with which it was finished.” (Suetonius : De Vita Caesarum Divas Julius) This hopefully will lay to rest any lingering speculation regarding the origin of a very famous quotation.

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/asbook.html

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

The channel crossing according to Dio “They were sent over in three divisions, in order that they not be hindered in landing as might happen to a single force, and in their voyage across they became discouraged because they were driven back in their course, and then plucked up courage because of a flash of light rising in the east shot across to the west, the direction in which they were sailing.  So they put into the island and found none to oppose them.”    This last is interesting because, unlike 55 and 54BC, this landing was apparently either in friendly territory, or, the Britons were taken completely by surprise.  The latter seems unlikely on account of the protracted preparations, abortive mutiny, and delays that the expedition had endured.  Traders, informants, fisherfolk, all would have reported the preparations for the imminent Roman arrival, providing enough time for local chieftains to raise their war bands had the Roman landing been uninvited or unwished for.  Dio provides a clue regarding this when he wrote “…. for a certain Bericus, who had been driven out of the island as a result of an uprising, had persuaded Claudius to send a force thither.”  If Dio is to be taken at his word, then this may have been more of a policing action to settle a local British dispute than it was an outright invasion.  The question has to be therefore asked whether the arrival of Plautius and his army in 43AD was actually intended as an invasion. 

Opposition to the arrival of a Roman army on British soil was eventually organised by the two sons of a recalcitrant, though deceased chief of the Catuvellauni tribe called, Cunobelin, the elder of which was called Caratacus, and the younger, Togodumnus.  This minor dynasty was responsible for expanding their tribal lands at the expense of their near neighbours the Atrebates, Trinovantes and the Cantium, and it could have been their ambition which prompted Plautius’s expedition.   An expedition which was seen as protecting those tribal leaders who were sympathetic to Rome and her ways, it may have began as nothing more than an attempt to restore the status quo, rather than a long term military commitment.  According to Cassius Dio, “the Britons as a result of their inquiries had not expected that they (the Romans) would come, and had therefore not assembled beforehand.  And even when they did assemble, they would not come to close quarters with the Romans, but took refuge in the swamps and the forests, hoping to wear out the invaders in fruitless effort, so that, just as in the days of Julius Caesar, they would sail back with nothing accomplished.” (Dio book LX 60 – xix) He continues “Plautius accordingly, had a deal of trouble in searching them out; but when at last he did find them, he first defeated Caratacus and then Togodumnus, the sons of Cynobellinus, who was dead.  After the flight of these kings he gained by capitulation a part of the Bodunni, who were ruled by a tribe of the Catuvellauni; leaving a garrison there, he advanced further and came to a river.”

The above passages provide for an alternative reason for the Briton’s failure to attack the Romans while they were at their most vulnerable.  If Dio is to be accepted, then the two warlords were hoping that this would turn out to be another brief excursion, that Plautius took it upon himself to extend and expand on his unforeseen luck of an unopposed landing can only be seen as a major error of judgement by Caratacus and Togodumnus.  Dio’s words “searching them out” is also ambiguous, did he mean searching out the native army, or did he mean searching for the two brothers.  Were they the reason for Plautius being there in the first place?  If so, then the invasion once more begins to look more like a policing action to rid the island of what he saw as constant trouble makers.    Provided Richborough, or a site close by was the landing place, the river to which Dio refers can, geographically, only have been the Medway which meanders its way southwards from its estuary west of the present Isle of Sheppey, past Maidstone and west through Tonbridge.  The alleged site of the battle has recently been commemorated by the setting up of an engraved stone at the village of Snodland (TQ 71 62) on the present A228 a short distance northwest of Maidstone.  The village lies close to the ancient trackway now called “The Pilgrim’s Way”, where it crosses the Medway but while the Pilgrim’s Way crosses the Downs in a west-north-westerly direction from Ashford to Maidstone, the more northern route which later became Watling Street leads almost directly west from Richborough to Maidstone.   Archaeological evidence to support the northern route was discovered in 1957, when a hoard of 34 gold coins dated to 41AD was found at Bredgar near Sittingbourne.  Frere (Britannia pp 64) says that this amount “…..was too small to represent a subsidy to some native prince, but it is too large to be the savings of and ordinary legionary soldier; moreover, the coins show progressive decrease in wear from the earliest to the latest, which suggests they represent a cross-section of the currency…….. Such a large sum (three months’ pay for a centurion) was probably the property of an officer, concealed before some skirmish, and it reinforces the view that the army passed north of the Downs by the route later laid out as Watling Street.”  The hoard is currently housed at the British Museum.   

In John Manleys book AD 43 – a reassessment he states the following :

“On 30 July 1957, when a trench was being dug for the foundations of a bungalow, 33 gold aurei were found and a subsequent search produced one further coin (Carson 1960). There was no sign of a container but since some of the coins were still stacked together the implication was that they had been packed in rolls and wrapped in cloth which had rotted. The coins range from Julius Caesar to Claudius with the four latest issued in the reign of Claudius in AD 41-2. The latest coins were in mint condition but the earlier coins were worn. Since no native coins were found with the hoard the find was associated with Roman as opposed to indigenous ownership. Pay for an ordinary centurion was about 150 aurei per year, and it was concluded that the 34 aurei could well have represented the personal savings of someone of the rank of centurion or upwards in the legions which invaded Britain in 43AD. Of course the location of the village of Bredgar, on the downs some 10 miles (16km) to the east of the Medway, and just before the line of the hills begins to descend towards the Medway, raised the obvious possibility that an official might have concealed these savings at the army’s last halting place before the battle of the Medway.

Superficially the argument is plausible, but underlying it are numerous assumptions: for instance that the hoard was concealed in the summer of AD43 , that it did belong to a Roman Officer, that it was hidden by him and not stolen from him , that the officer was part of an invading unit heading for the Medway – all these things are unknowable. In addition it seems debatable whether and campaigning officer fighting in a contested invasion would carry with him his personal savings. What did Roman soldiers do with their pay when they were on the march? Surely pay, or any savings accrued, were kept in safely guarded stores, capable of being redeemed by an individual when the progress of the campaign allowed some leisure time. In addition , it again seems likely that an officer would deliberately conceal a personal fortune , knowing that his army was on the march and would stay at a particular location for only a brief period of time. In reality the Bredgar Hoard may imply the presence nearby of the Roman Military but it tells us nothing of the size of the force, the year in which it was present , the direction it was taking, and least of all is it proof for the battle of the Medway.

The hoard could just as easily represent payment to a British Chief who collaborated with the invasion force.”

In Autumn 1999 Kent Archaeological Field School announced discovery of a possible 4 acre Roman Fort at Syndale near Faversham. 

At Snodland there has been a local ferry across the Medway to Burnham since at least the 16^th century.  There is no mention of there ever having been a ford in the immediate vicinity.  This might be evidence for other renditions of these events, but for the sake of narrative, it requires a decision to be made, as with so much of this period.  Snodland and it’s environs were the sites of extensive marsh-lands, drained since the 19^th century and before.  Those marshes used to extend south from Rochester (Durobrivae) almost to Aylesford, they often extended for a few hundred yards on both banks of the river making the prospect of chariot warfare very unlikely.  It becomes more apparent to this writer that any successful crossing of the Medway HAD to take place where the river banks were capable of withstanding the use of both cavalry and chariots, similarly marsh and bog would have hindered the legions ability to manoeuvre.  It is with these things in mind that the suggestion is made that the crossing could not have occurred at Snodland, but rather only either at Rochester where the river is narrow, and swimmers could have traversed at slack water, or that it took place much further south, even near Larkfield, where there is evidence of Roman occupation.  Rochester however lies along the route of Watling Street, there was a crossing, though at that time, no bridge, it seems right, it seems to fit the scenario.   

In addition John Manley tells us  “A military style ditch , deliberately backfilled , was located beneath the later villa at Eccles in the mid-1970’s , just to the East of the Medway and reasonably close to the Medway Monument. The ditch was traced east-west for a length of 92.65m. no corners were located and the ditch contained pottery apparently earlier than AD65. However the full report is still to be published.”

To close this vague section, it might be helpful to have it summarised by the words of the closing conclusion from the special symposium on the landing places hosted by the Sussex Archaeological Society, 23^rd October, 1999, spoken by Professor Barry Cunliffe of Oxford University.  “In summarising what everyone agreed to be a very stimulating and worthwhile conference, Professor Cunliffe reinforced the point that he had made at the very start of the day, that it is vital to be open-minded and unprejusticed in all archaeology.  Tradition has no god-given right to be correct and we should always try to focus on a problem without being too partisan.  In the 1880’s Clausentum (Southampton Water) was suggested as the landing place for the AD43 invasion.  The discovery of the structures at Richborough brought that site into prominence, and gradually new Solent ideas re-emerged while Kent was quoted in the major textbooks.  Hind’s article in 1989 has thrown another light on the subject, bringing the bias back to Sussex.  There is no doubt that the invasion was set in a complex geopolitical context and the debate should continue, using an open mind to consider the evidence.”  It is hoped that this site, while adhering to the traditional, has looked at the evidence with an open mind.

The Medway Crossing

The physical obstacle posed by the river Medway led to what might arguably be seen as one of the most decisive battles on British soil, for it’s eventual outcome led to nearly 400 years of Roman authority.  The name Medway might stem back to pre-Roman days, one theory being that it derives from ‘Medu’ meaning either mead or sweet water. The two armies ranged up facing each other, with Plautius’ legions constantly maneuvering in order to keep the British tied down observing their movements in order to best counter them whenever and however they decided to attempt the river crossing.  It was on the west bank of the Medway the Britons had decided to make their stand, thinking that the river would provide sufficient of a barrier, enough to give them the advantage.  Of the battle, Dio says “The barbarians thought that the Romans would not be able to cross it (the river) without a bridge, and consequently bivouacked in rather careless fashion on the opposite bank; but he (Plautius) sent across a detachment of Germans, who were accustomed to swim easily in full armour across the most turbulent of streams.”  This translation, states that it was a Germanic unit that swam over the river, but others are equally as adamant that it should read – Κελτους – which, they say translates as Keltoi or, Celts, but no reference is made to their origin be them from northern Gaul, Germanic tribes or indeed, Britain.  Tacitus however does mention the Batavians, and that there were eight cohorts of them, a force which would amount to no less than 4,000 men.  So who were these elite troops, soldiers able to swim rivers in full armour, the Batavi? They came from what is today northern Holland, a people who were excellent horsemen brought up in the winding waterways of the Low-countries.

It seems likely that they were mixed units of cavalry and infantry strongly loyal to Rome, to the point that they had the honour of proving the guard cavalry to Julius Caesar.  Their method of traversing water-causes would likely have been by clinging onto their horses mains, or their saddles, this could enable each horse to support two men, it’s rider, and another.  As soon as Plautius ordered their advance, they entered the waters of the Medway, and soon were able to make a crossing that took the Britons totally by surprise.  They had orders to disable the enemy’s horses, which would disable their most formidable fighting arm, their chariots.  The constant movement of Roman troops would have permitted these cohorts to slip out of British observation to a place where they could cross the river without being seen.  That objective was successfully accomplished, and their appearance behind the ranks of bemused Britons led to their total confusion.  Their main weapon was being decimated; their chariots and their horses would no longer be of any practical use to them.  As the Britons tried to salvage what they could from the assault of the Batavi, this enabled Plautius to launch his main assault with his heavy infantry, his legions.  Led by Flavius Sabinus and Vespasian, (presumably) with the Legio II Augusta (although there is no evidence to support the presumption), the legions made a safe crossing, and established a bridgehead on the west bank of the Medway.  Fighting became fierce in the extreme as the forces of Caratacus attacked the legions.  Of Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus), who was to become emperor  in 69AD, until his death in 79AD., Suetonius has little to say regarding these events in Britannia, in his De Vita Caesarum–Divus Vespasianus iv, he says “In the reign of Claudius he was sent in command of a legion to Germania, through the influence of Narcissus; from there he was transferred to Britannia [See Claud. xvii], where he fought thirty battles with the enemy.”   The subsequent conquest of the Isle of Wight (Vecits) by Vespasian received far more comment in contemporary biographies than did his adventures prior to the Emperor’s arrival on land of the British.  Not enough is mentioned that adds to our knowledge of this campaign, while other events in the same biography receive far more in-depth coverage.  This could be indicative that legend and tradition has been at work over the centuries, or that his involvement at Medway was not considered that decisive.  To the rallying call of their bronze war horn, called the Carnax, the Britons rallied and fought for their king, their land, and their way of life.  In ever increasing desperation they threw themselves at the steady lines and phalanxes of the roman cohorts.  The day closed with neither side able to claim victory, the British withdrew to nearby woodlands, and rested, the legions too took as much sleep as adrenaline and battlefield conditions would permit.  The following day dawned and conflict resumed, a second day of battle, a rare event for those times, such was the determination and desperation with which this was fought.  Their lack of effective cavalry and the use of their chariots though eventually began to tell.  However, decisive actions were necessary to bring about a victory, according to Dio, “the struggle was indecisive until Gnaeus Hosidius Geta, after narrowly missing being captured, finally managed to defeat the Barbarians so soundly that he received the ornamenta triumphalia, though he had never been a consul.”  Precisely what actions were taken by Geta might never be known, although many have speculated, they were though, sufficient on the day for him to receive an honour from the emperor.  The ornamenta triumphalia had evolved from the more traditional Roman triumphs, which had become the preserve of the imperial family.  To compensate, this honour was introduced which allowed for the recipient to be granted titles, to be allowed to appear in public wearing the robes of imperators and to be able to bequeath to their descendants, triumphal statues.  It is often stated that Geta was the Legate of the Legio II Augusta, and therefore, it was that legion which he led against the British.  It seems logical, but again, there is no supportive evidence of any kind.  The actions taken by Geta were enough to break the fighting spirit of the Britons, and they withdrew towards the next natural barrier.  Caratacus and his brother must have been able to contain the defeat for rather than becoming a rout, there was a semi-organised retreat towards the River Thames.  

Dio says “Thence the Britons retired to the river Thames at a point near where it empties into the ocean and at flood tide forms a lake.  This they easily crossed because they knew where the firm ground and the easy passages in this region were to be found.”(LX 60. xx) Once again, the question of location raises its enigmatic head.  Many have been the theories as to where the description of Dio leads.  Current research has shown that there was/may have been, a gravel bank forming a shallow ford crossing the Thames in the vicinity of Westminster and Lambeth.  What today is Westminster was in the 1^st century, an island which has been called Thorney Island, one of the earlier Time Team programs, while excavating the grounds of Lambeth Palace, had a look at the river, and local knowledge suggested that remnants of this bank survive.  Down stream from this was the tidal head of the Thames, between the current Westminster Bridge and London Bridge is even today called the Pool of London.

The riverbanks then were not as those of today which have been manicured by man.  Then they were open and likely to flood at high water.  This would have resulted in swamps and reed beds which the heavily armoured legions would have found difficult to navigate in the best of circumstances, and might account for what seems to be lacking from Dio’s description of the forthcoming battle, the legions.  The Celts (Batavi) were once more employed to swim the river, while others managed to find a bridge further up-stream.  Any bridge would have been a rudimentary affair compared to the massive structures built by Caesar, and may only have supported a few men crossing at any one time.  Dio makes no mention that this bridge was defended, which seems odd, but sufficient men were able to cross for them be able to aid their mounted comrades down-stream. 

From Dio it appears that the two forces outflanked the waiting Britons and were able in inflict many casualties.  The lack of horses to drive their chariots and to mount their cavalry would have hindered British tactics and their ability to manoeuvre.   They were caught in the jaws of the typical Roman style pincer tactic.  Meanwhile, the legions seem to have got themselves lost in the reed beds and marshes, incurring enough casualties, likely from drowning, for Dio to make mention of it “In pursuing the remainder incautiously, they got into the swamps from which it was difficult to make their way out, and so lost a number of men.”  This defeat of the Britons was decisive on the day, and they melted away, resistance it seems had stopped.  An event happened soon after the battle finished which seems ambiguous.  Dio LX 60.xxi states “Shortly afterwards (the battle) Togodumnus perished, but the Britons, so far from yielding, united all the more firmly to avenge his death.  Because of this fact and because of the difficulties he had encountered at the Thames, Plautius became afraid, and instead of advancing any further, proceeded to guard what he had already won, and sent for Claudius.”  Once more, there could be a question mark over the translation of the text here, and personally lacking the knowledge, I have used the words from the above-mentioned web site –  “The conventional translation gives that the death of Togodumnus occurred later but the text seems to state quite plainly that it was because of the death of Togodumnus and its effect on the rest of the Britons that Plautius became alarmed. Also the use of jqapentoV the Aorist Passive Participle of the verb jqeirw, to describe the death itself is a strange choice because the strict translation of this verb in the Passive is not so much ‘to kill’ as ‘to destroy.’ Something is done to the individual that causes his death, unlike the usual apokueinw which means ‘to kill’, pure and simple, in the Active as well as the Passive. Togodumnus was a prince of Britain whose father, Cunobelin had reigned for forty years and whose patron had been Augustus himself. If Togodumnus had died normally in a normal battle then it cannot surely have caused anything other that the normal reaction to a warrior’s death, however noble. There seems from the text something abnormal about his death that roused normally placid Britons to fight in his name. Could he have been executed? Could the Celts on the Roman side have taken revenge for things that Togodumnus had done during the insurrection? Had he been captured first then formally been put to death instead of being given the usual courtesy afforded to noble prisoners that had been captured in battle. It would seem that Plautius had nothing to do with it because of its effect on Plautius and on the Britons. Note that it was the effect not only on the BarBaroi but the BreTTanoi as well. The occasion and the manner of his death had united the ‘Barbarians’ and the ‘Britons’ and this was the fact that alarmed Plautius and caused him to alert Claudius. This would seem to indicate that up until then the whole venture could not have been thought to be on the scale of an invasion. If four legions and their auxiliaries had been present, the reaction of Plautius would not have been that of alarm. It would have been the culmination of what he had come for and it is nonsensical to suggest that he would have sent for Claudius for moral and physical support. What it does suggest is that the venture had plainly escalated out of control and that he had to send to Claudius for reinforcements.”  From this and Dio, it would seem that Plautius made his position defensive, which would mean a fort or forts of some substance.  Archaeology has to date failed to either locate or define where these where.  And while London, or Londinium became the imperial capital of the island, that was several years in the future.  How far Plautius ranged from the original crossing is not mentioned but the suggestion is that it was not far, however, it remains a possibility that he could have fortified the site that was to become Londinium.  There might be some clues from the layout of Roman roads, but once again, academics do not agree about the course of 1^st century roads, and at this time, they might not have yet existed.  At the same time, it maybe that as part of Plautius’ fortifications and defences he instigated the construction of the roads leading to the Thames crossing from Kent.  There is archaeological evidence for a fort within Roman London, at Cripplegate, but it has been attributed to the early 2^nd century and as quarters for the governor’s guards (Singulares).  Similarly, London Bridge was the original location for the Roman bridge over the Thames, but it too was of later date and although it would be convenient for the bridge to have formed the crossing for Claudius when he arrived, there is no case to be made.  The hiatus is also difficult to resolve with certainty.  Paulius had accepted the submissions of several British tribes since his initial landing(s) and they continued to submit after the battle to cross the river Thames while others continued the resistance.  It maybe that he sought reinforcements from the continental mainland, or it might have been that he had prior instructions to halt his advance at some strategic point in order to inform Claudius, so that he could make an imperial event of the march to, and conquest of  Camulodunum (Colchester) which was the headquarters of Caratacus and his sphere of influence in the south-east.  Frere (Britannia) says that word was sent to the Emperor at the beginning of July, and that Claudius arrived about mid-August, this is about six weeks, not very long if the request was unexpected, and if the required reinforcements were to be found and marched to the Channel ports.  Frere also says that Plautius withdrew to the southern banks of the Thames during this time, which seems both un-necessary if local tribes had given their submission, and if they had not, then the prospect of once more having to force a crossing, this time under the critical eye of his Emperor would have been a daunting prospect indeed.

by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton

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