After the abortive, and militarily embarrassing events of the previous year, Julius Caesar re-grouped his forces, re-thought his strategy and tactics, and determined to recover some of his dented credibility with another attempt at a landing in Britain. The only sources available, are Classical ones, as stated previously, no records exist from the British viewpoint. It is a well-known phenomenon, that the overall victors are the ones who write the history, in this event only the Roman perspective has come down to us. The veracity therefore of the Classical chronicles, has to be suspect, as has been evidenced by so many revelations about another empire, ironically, the British, which have shown, that there is always another side to every coin. This, together with an almost none-existent archaeological record provides little with which to work. It would be easy to copy verbatim, those same chronicles, and say – this was so – it might not have been so at all, but it is all we have, that, and some insight, and it has to be said, some speculation.
The first clue to the events of 54B.C. are from Cassius Dio, who in his book XL he states that Caesar “among other undertakings constructed ships of a style half-way between his own swift vessels and the native ships of burden (trading vessels), endeavoring to make them at once as light and as seaworthy as possible and capable of being left high and dry without injury.” This indicates the intention for the ships be capable of being beached, thereby reducing the threat of them being lost to wind and sea while at anchor. It also points to a major military enterprise, the organisation, and logistics required to construct, from scratch, an entire fleet would have been prodigious. Indeed, according to Caesar’s Gallic Wars 5.2, it says “When he arrived there (the army camped on the north shores of Gaul), having made a survey of the winter quarter, he finds that, by the extraordinary ardour (hard work) of the soldiers, amid the utmost scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described above and twenty eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from that state, that they might be launched in a few days.” The ships, as described in this work, were according to this text “For the dispatch (speed) of lading (loading), and for drawing them on shore, he makes them a little lower (shallower draught) than those which we have been accustomed to use in our sea (the Mediterranean); and that so much more, because he knew that, on account of the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the purpose of transporting burdens and a great number of horses, (they were to be) a little broader (wider in the beam) than those which we use in other seas.” It seems, from this, that the invasion fleet, which it has to be viewed as, were of a type of vessel, especially designed for the purpose of transporting a very large body of troops and all their horses, plus equipment and baggage, to a potentially hostile shore, in tidal conditions and unpredictable weather.
This was no opportunist raid, as 55B.C. may be seen as, this was to be a full sea-bourn invasion. There is, as far as is known, no surviving evidence, archaeological, or otherwise, as to the actual appearance of any of this huge fleet. By the time the repaired vessels of the previous expedition, and private vessels of officers were included, the fleet numbered approximately 800 ships. In order to try and establish the numbers of soldiers employed on this expedition, we are told that there were 2,000 cavalry, if one assumes a minimum of 20 horses to a ship, this accounts for approximately 100 ships. The remaining 700, were manned mainly by soldiers, it seems, therefore, if we again assume a minimum of 50 soldiers to each vessel, on average, then a total number of 35,000 men would appear to be the smallest number required, although no figures are anywhere indicated, there could well have been considerably more. The argument for this force to be larger than 35,000 men is a strong one, because when the four legions under the command of Aulus Plautius landed in 43 A.D., the total number of men has been estimated, and often quoted as being 40,000, and this with one legion less than Julius Caesar.
After some administrative concerns had been dealt with, Caesar was able to concentrate on the project in hand, and according to his own writings, embarked five entire legions and two thousand cavalry, together with, presumably, a substantial quota of Auxiliaries. When the wind and weather were from the appropriate quarter, the fleet set sail, from Boulogne and Port Itius in particular, and possibly other ports on the north Gaulish coast. The night of July 6 is sometimes quoted as being the date of departure, although there is no documentary evidence to support this conjecture. What Caesar describes next, is very telling, and revealing. There has been much debate concerning the actual landing sites for all three landings. This one however, is by far the best described, and leaves little doubt to the area of the landings in Britain, if not the precise location. In Caes.gal.5.8, it states that they “set sail at sunset, and bourn forward by a gentle south-west wind, he was unable to maintain his course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left.” This is quite categorical, what is being described is that the fleet, made considerable leeway, on a tide setting eastward as the wind dropped, this on a roughly northern course, means that the fleet were pushed in the direction of where Dover is today, and beyond. Indeed, for Britain to be on the left, – or port side – means that they had been forced towards the narrows which then separated the mainland from the Isle of Thanet, not the best of places for a landing, with strong tidal currents, tide rips and an uncertain bottom. Instead of Britain being ahead of them, it was to their left, this is a vital clue. Had the tide however set them to the west, then the land would have been on their right (starboard), this therefore has to be excluded as a possibility. However, Caesar seemed aware of both the dangers of his whereabouts, and where he wished to be. At the turn of the tide, and with the aid of their oars (yet another clue to the appearance of the fleet), they altered their course westward. The chronicle continues “Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged them on with the oars, that he might make that part of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer, that there was the best landing place, and in this affair the spirit of the soldiers was very much extolled, for they (the soldiers) with the transports and heavy ships, the labour of rowing not being discontinued, equaled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day:…
This then provides one answer as to where the landing took place, for if we know the time of year, (July?) and the rate of the tide added to the cruising speed of a Roman galley, and multiply it by the time between sunrise and mid-day, it gives us a distance. From current records, a mean tidal flow rate of ebb/flood tides in the Dover area, is about 70cm per second, which, multiplied up, is roughly 15 kilometers (see : http://www.shom.fr/fr_page/fr_act_geo/TPlidierleb.html ) over six hours between sunrise and mid-day. The maximum speed of war galleys under oars was about 10 – 12k per hour, this however was not maintainable for any length of time, and a cruising speed over the water of this fleet of about 3 – 4k per hour seems more reasonable. Given that the majority of the troops had landed by mid-day, a rowing time of 4 hours would provide a reasonable estimate. This gives us a figure of about 30k, from the point at which the fleet changed it’s course. If they had reached as far north as the area around Sandwich, then, measuring back, this places the landing site somewhere close to the present-day Folkestone.
Certainly, from the South Foreland light east of Dover, to the western extremity of East Wear Bay, any kind of landing is very unlikely, as this is where the Chalk cliffs of the North Downs drop perpendicularly into the sea. To the west of the Folkestone area, were the Romney Marshes, not the best terrain for military maneuverings, nor does it fit any of the descriptions mentioned in the texts. Next west is the headland of Dungeness, a place also unsuitable for a sea-bourn assault. Anywhere further west similarly, does not fit in with Caesar’s description. It may be no coincidence that Folkestone, was the eastern end of the ancient British trackway known as the North Downs Trackway, which would have been vital for moving large numbers of troops into the British hinterland.
Theorised routes of channel crossing
At this point, is seems appropriate to explain a little about the legions of Caesar. The texts show that each was known by a number at this time, and may have had either official, or, unofficial titles, however, their composition was well established, regardless of some minor adjustments. A Caesarian legion was composed of about 5,000 men, organised into 10 Cohorts, of 500 men each. Legions had an assortment of officers, many of which were political appointments. The Legate, who had nominal command, while under him, were the Tribunes, of which the usual number was 6, these were the military commanders. The legion standard, the Aquila, or ‘Eagle,’ was carried by the Aquilifer. Each cohort was divided into 6 Centuries of 80 men, and each Century had it’s own Centurion in command, with an Optio as his back-up, each had it’s own standard, the Signum, carried by the Signifer, and a trumpeter, called a Cornicen, the trumpets being almost circular in design. Another officer allotted to each Century was the Tesserarius, who’s primary role was concerned with guard duties. There was a small cavalry element attached to each legion, but they served mainly as scouts, and dispatch riders.
The cavalry, as employed by Caesar in 54A.D. were likely, either Gallic or Germanic auxiliaries organised into units called Alae each having a strength of 500 men. Each Alae was divided into 16 Turmae of 32 officers and men. This is by necessity, simplistic, and there are many works that discuss this aspect of military life in pre-empire times in considerably more detail.
The ‘normal’ appearance of a Roman legionary, the common foot-soldier, had yet to make an appearance, although their weapons were the all familiar Gladius (short stabbing sword) Pilum (javelin with soft metal head designed to bend on penetrating impact either on shield, horse, or man, in order to kill, wound or hamper the movements of the unfortunate recipient.) The shield, oval at this period, was called a Scutum, while helmets were of an almost conical design in some cases, round in others with descending cheek guards and simpler to the later well known types, any crests were likely to have been horse hair plumes. The body armour was a tunic of mail, rather than the almost ubiquitous Lorica Segmentata, the hooped metal plate armour of later periods, also lacking seems to have been the studded leather straps which protected the groin area.
These then were the legionaries who disembarked onto what they feared would be a hostile shore. However, the British, who had gathered together under a single war chief, a man called Cassivellaunus who was ricon – or king of the Catuvellauni people who’s domain reached from the northern banks of the river Thames into the current Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire. According to Caesar, who’s account it is now necessary to follow, after seeing the quantity of ships landing troops, the watching Britons, located on the hills and cliffs overlooking the landing beaches, retreated. It may be however, that those were a scouting party, sent to determine where the Romans had landed, and – once seeing them ashore – departed to report to their king. Once ashore, a suitable location was found for the construction of a camp – it is unfortunate that no archaeological evidence for this place has been discovered, for it would resolve once and for all, where, exactly, this event took place. The fleet, he left at anchor, under the guardianship of ten cohorts, possibly two from each legion, and three hundred cavalry, who, it must be assumed, secured the camp, and the beachhead. It means that nearly 6,000 men were left to guard the ships, and the beach, which would be required to land them on, should the weather once again prove to be dangerous. The idea of leaving the fleet at anchor, knowing how treacherous the weather could be, suggests that Caesar was concerned that the British might be tempted to attack the camp, and if possible burn the ships, which would have left him and his army totally isolated. Safer therefore to leave them at anchor for as long as possible, and only beach them under the direst of meteorological threats. Caesar left Quintus Atrius in command of the guard, and the fleet. According to Caesar’s account, the army then proceeded to advance in the direction taken by the retreating British for a distance of twelve miles, where he says, they saw the enemy, advancing towards ‘the river.’ This river is assumed to be the river Stour, and this, geographically, is difficult to rationalise, as there is no part of the southern Kent coast that lies within a twelve-mile radius of that river. If the Folkestone area was the landing site, then it may be assumed, that the British would have retreated along the ‘North Down’s Trackway’, which terminated close to that site. The other, often quoted landing place is Deal, north of Dover, this location suffers from the same inconsistency of geography, being almost equidistant from Bigbury, as the proposed Folkestone site. It is logical also to assume, that in order to move over 30,000 men, such a track-way would be necessary for any kind of rapid advance. As the legions climbed the heights of the North Downs, the British commenced what can only be described as hit and run tactics, harrying the legions using their cavalry and chariots. Of any river crossing, Caesar makes no mention at this point, so maybe, it was of small military importance, he continues to say however, that the British had refortified what can only have been a hill-fort. Theories abound, but it seems generally accepted, that the site of this fort was at Bigbury, just west of the present day Canterbury. Of the fort Caesar says this “they concealed themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war, for all the entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees.” This describes a place that had been prepared in advance, a place where some consideration had been given to either delaying, or halting the Roman progress. Warriors were also hidden in the woods close by, from which they sallied forth to defend the fort’s entrances. Resistance was valiant – if futile – the soldiers of the 7th legion formed a testudo – or tortoise, then threw up a rampart against the fort’s defences. The testudo, was a formation of men in close order which were able to use their shields to make an impenetrable shell for the whole number of men enclosed. The interlocked shields covered the front, sides, rear, and top of the formation. This now familiar tactic, was revolutionary to the British, they had no clue how to either attack it, or defend against it. Having breached the fort’s defences, the battle was virtually over, after some sporadic fighting, the British withdrew, leaving it in the possession of the successful 7th legion, who suffered, but few casualties. Caesar then refortified the site to Roman specifications, and settled his army down within its earthen walls and ramparts for a well deserved rest. The following morning, in an attempt to discover in which direction the British had withdrawn, the column was divided into three, and ordered to scour the countryside for any sign of them. It was not long before the stragglers of the British were found, but at about the same time, messages were received at Caesar’s headquarters, that disaster had, once again, hit the fleet of anchored ships. A storm had arisen during the previous night, and damaged or destroyed many of the ships. Quintus Atrius reported by messenger that most of the fleet had been sunk, or badly damaged. After Caesar’s experience of 55B.C., he was nervous about this news, it was, most likely, the worst thing that could befall the expedition. The columns were immediately recalled, and he personally returned to the beachhead to find out the exact extent of the damage. It was not as bad as he feared, about forty ships had been lost, and many others damaged, but mostly, not beyond repair. Orders were issued to selected workmen from the legions to set about repairing those ships which could be repaired, and a message was sent back across the Channel – to Labenius – to instigate the rapid construction of as many more new ships as could be produced by the legions he had with him on the Continent to replace those lost. He then ordered all the still floating ships to be hauled ashore, for their future security. It was a massive task to ask of his legionaries, as it was necessary also to extend the fortified camp on the shore to include all the soon to be beached vessels. It took ten days, and nights, of unremitting labour to complete the whole endeavour, after which the fleet was safely beached behind extended and reinforced fortifications. Such a strongly defended position would, one assumes, have left at least some archaeological evidence, but to date, nothing of it has been found. It might be that the site has in the intervening two millennia, been eroded away, and has fallen into the sea. This argues against the Folkestone site, as, the land there has in fact extended from the Roman shore, and, it would by now be a considerable distance inland. Where ever the site was, Caesar left the same ten cohorts and cavalry to defend the beach, and set off back to Bigbury fort where the Britons had taken advantage of the hiatus to regroup, reinforce, re-organise, and re-think their tactics. It has to be said here, that Caesar’s Gallic Wars, as helpful as it maybe, can also be unhelpful too. The next part of his narrative speaks of several encounters between the two forces, but lacks any indication as to location. All he says is this and that occurred at ‘the camp,’ though whether this was still Bigbury camp, or later marching camps, remains a unresolved. Logic dictates, that he was referring to marching camps, as his column advanced into the lands of the Cantiaci. As there is also made mention of ‘miles’ as a distance, this needs to be defined. A Roman mile, or mille passuum, was a distance of 1,000 paces measured at 5 feet per pace. This means a Roman mile was 5,000 feet, as opposed to 5,280 feet in the British Statute mile, and compares with the kilometre of 1.48 per Roman mile. It has also been suggested that a Roman legion could march between 15 and 30 m.p. a day. This would depend heavily on the terrain, and the access to their own paved roads, or lack of them.
Cassivellaunus, as said, had been made overall war leader of the British tribes, this would not have sat very well with several of them, as leader of the Catuvellauni he had been responsible for the overpowering of many of the disaffected tribes, their homeland was north and west of the River Thames, although their influence spread much further, and it might have been Cassivellaunus’s own personality which enabled the temporary alliance between tribes, because such a concept of cooperation was not alien to their way of life. Spies and informants reported some of this to Caesar as his army advanced west into Kent, and north towards the Thames. His intention may have been to take, capture, or kill Cassivellaunus, and thereby removing in one fell swoop, the resistance of the tribes. What ever his motives, Caesar had to find a ford across the heavily tidal river Thames. It was during the advance when, after an un-successful raid by British chariots, and cavalry, that an over zealous section of Romans chased too far, and consequently became isolated from the main column, Caesar reports several deaths as a result. Another encounter was at the site of a marching camp where engineers, engaged in fortifying the camp, were unexpectedly attacked by a large force of British. Two cohorts were sent as reinforcements, but they, being from different legions, did not form a close enough unit, which allowed the British to engage the gap between the cohorts, and thereby make their escape. The death of Quintus Laberius Durus, a tribune, was reported. Caesar says at this point “In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took place under the eyes and before the camp, it was perceived that our men, on account of the weight of their arms, in as much as they could neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse [cavalry] also fought with great danger, because the [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and when they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat, and to those who pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed [in different parts]; and then one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded [replaced] the wearied.” The day after the above events there occurred yet another attack while the legionaries had been instructed to do some foraging. The attack came from all quarters, and even got within striking distance of the revered legionary eagles. The danger to their eagles might have been the spur required for the legions to regroup, and after awaiting the arrival of the cavalry arm a counter attack was made with great success. So great was the victory, that afterwards, any attacks that were made were puny in comparison, and of small account. The allied tribes however had not been defeated, they had withdrawn to yet another fortified line of defence, the River Thames. This seems quite unequivocal Caes Gal 5.18 states “Caesar, having discovered their design, leads his army into the territory of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames which river can be forded in one place only, and that with difficulty.” This now poses the question, how did Caesar know it was the river Thames – was it the same waterway as that known today? In order to check this it is necessary to venture into the original Latin text – which says – ‘flumen Tamesim’ – river Tamesem, when then, and from where did the Tamesem part come from? According to a dictionary of English place names it says ‘ Thames – Tamesis 51B.C. An ancient Celtic river name possibly meaning ‘dark one’ or simply ‘river’’. Which means that the river Thames could actually mean – river River !! If this is so – then the finite acceptance that Caesar did cross the Thames may not be finite at all.
It has been suggested that the Thames had several crossing points, not bridges, but fords, or causeways. Locations for these fords have been proposed, they include, Battersea, Brentford, and Westminster, all of which have been verified as possible fords by archaeologists. The Westminster site seems to be the current favourite. There was an extension of the later built Watling Street which appears to have crossed the river in that location, and there is evidence of an island off the northern bank which has been called Thorney, and it has to be said, that Caesar also mentions ‘alteram fluminis ripam’ – a second river bank, which would have to be assaulted in the case of a ford at this point. However, it must be pointed out that all this is conjecture, and the locations of roman crossing places of the Thames is still a hotly debated topic amongst academics.
The Britons had very likely, by means of false information lead Caesar to the desired ford because when the legions approached the south bank, the opposite bank was lined with a great multitude of warriors and the river banks had been fortified with stakes embedded into the ground, some above water, some below. Caesar did not hesitate long and dispatched his cavalry across the river, and then ordered forward his legions in support. The defences were not very effective, and the Romans landed in relative safety immediately falling upon the enemy. Likely surprised by the ease with which the Romans had crossed the barrier of the river, the British quickly lost heart, and made their escapes as best they could. Cassivellaunus was able to retain control of over 4,000 chariots, and, as they withdrew into their own heartland, they drove before them all the cattle and people, thereby depriving the advancing legions of plunder, slaves, and food stocks. The cavalry were instructed, after several sorties had been ambushed, not to venture too far from the relative security of the legions. The defeat of Cassivellaunus at the Thames seems to have been the catalyst for a more general revolt of his self imposed authority. Several disaffected tribes began to make embassies to Caesar, premier among them was Mandubratius of the Trinovantes who’s father had been slain by Cassivellaunus. The offer to surrender them selves to Rome, rather than endure the dominance of other Britons might appear a strange thing to do. It could be however, that the prospect of peace and security, under the umbrella of Rome was more appealing than their own British heritage, a concept, which may not have then been apparent to them. In exchange for their promised loyalty, the tribes invited Caesar to install a Roman dignitary to oversee their protection and interests from a vengeful Cassivellaunus, a Roman who by his simple presence would hopefully deter any incursions into Trinovantian lands. Caesar readily agreed, but added the provisos that forty hostages be handed over, and his army be provided with as much corn as they required. Once the negotiations had been completed between Caesar and the Trinobantes, other tribes soon followed suit. Those named by Caesar were the Cenemagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, all of which sent embassies to Caesar. It was – it is said – from these embassies that Caesar learned of the location of the ‘command centre’ of Cassivellaunus, and that it was not far from his present location.
While these events had been happening north of the Thames, to the south of that river, Cassivellaunus had used what remained of his authority with those tribes still loyal to him, those who’s kings were called Cingetorix, Carvillius, Taximagulus and Segonax to rally their warriors, and assemble them ready for an all out attack on the fortified landing site and beached fleet of ships, which were Caesar’s sole line of communication with Gaul. Likely as a result of an uncoordinated attack by the rival British kings, they were soon defeated with heavy losses, to such a degree that news of the disaster was immediately sent north to Cassivellaunus. He however, had trouble enough of his own to contend with. Caesar had discovered the whereabouts of his main camp, which had been fortified with ditches and earthen walls. Approaches to the camp were made difficult by the proximity of dense woodlands and bog-land. It must have seemed a formidable place to assault.
It was not however Caesar’s way, to procrastinate, and he launched an attack from two directions, which was decisive. The British fled to an enclave within the camp where “A great many cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.”
The location of this last stand it has been claimed, was at the earthwork known today as Devil’s Dyke, at Wheathampstead, in Hertfordshire, just north of the later Roman settlement called Verulanium, today called, St. Albans. Evidence of Belgic occupation of the site circa 50 B.C., was discovered by Sir Mortimer Wheeler, when he excavated there in the 1930’s. The ditch has been estimated as being130 feet wide at the top, and 40 feet deep, and though much eroded, much of it’s impressiveness can still be envisaged there today. It may be surmised that this earthwork was linked to another very close by, called the Stad, being as they are, even today almost linked by a wet ditch called The Moat.
If these three features were combined in 54 B.C. they would have made an enormous rectangular enclosure defended on at least three sides. The northern side, is seemingly open, although it might be possible that any defensive features on this side have been lost. A display board in a local museum says “For at least 100 years before the Roman Conquest in AD 43 this part of Hertfordshire was the heartland of a powerful and aggressive tribe known as Catuvellauni, Celtic for ‘expert warrior’….. The earliest capital of the Catuvellauni is likely to have been at Wheathampstead. ….. Here are massive earthworks known as Devil’s Dyke. ……… This was attacked by Julius Caesar in 54 BC. “
Cassivellaunus, learning of the betrayal of several tribes, the massive defeat on the Kent coast, which added to the devastation of his own lands, and the huge loss of life of his people and his warriors, had no other option but to sue for peace. Though the intermediary, Commius, an Atrebatian, arrangements were made for the hand over of hostages, and the payment of tribute to Rome. Agreement was also extracted for Cassivellaunus not to take revenge, or make war upon either Mandubratius, or the Trinovantes as a whole. News had arrived that revolt had broken out in Gaul, and Caesar was desperate to return there to restore Roman authority. Consequently, subsequent to the reception of the hostages and tribute, the legions made their way back to the waiting fleet, who’s losses had been replaced, and repairs all but completed ready for the embarkation of the army and it’s acquired masses of prisoners. The season too made it imperative that the crossing be made with dispatch, as the equinoctial storms were soon expected, and Caesar needed his legions intact for Gaul. So it was that the Roman army left British shores, not to return for almost a hundred years, a hiatus which was to see many changes, both in Rome, and in Britain. It seems, after this span of time to be an anti-climactic end to such a great endeavour, indeed, from some contemporary commentaries, it seemed so at the time too, as Caesar returned with no grand plunder, and seemingly nothing to show for the entire campaign. His legacy was however to influence British tribal politics for the next hundred years, and for those tribes who had embraced the arrival of the Romans, it began a period of pre-Romanisation, which would eventually lead to historic consequences.
It cannot be over emphasised just how much of the above narrative depends on the writings of Caesar, not an especially unbiased account of things. Much remains speculation, and argument and debate continue amongst academics. Archaeology has yet to prove or disprove most of the above, and, while discoveries are still being made, they remain sparse, and inconclusive.
I came, I saw, I conquered!
As a brief aside, a post-script, and to clarify a minor oft quoted misconception, it is sometimes said that Julius Caesar uttered the immortal words “Veni vedi vici” at the conclusion of his British expeditions of 55 B.C. and 54 B.C. It is necessary here to correct this perceived error which has somehow crept into British historical myth. It was several years after Caesar had turned his army, his thoughts, and his back on the British Isles, when, after the military competition between himself and his rival for control of Rome, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known more generally to history as, Pompey, came to an end with the murder of Pompey in Egypt. His ignoble end came as a result of his army being defeated by that of Caesar’s at the battle of Pharsalia in August, 48 B.C. After a brief dalliance in Alexandria with the Egyptian queen, Cleopatra, his presence was required at the location of a small local disturbance in north-eastern Anatolia where, Pharnaces, king of the Cimmerian Bospherus, in 47 B.C. had taken advantage of Caesar’s pre-occupation in Egypt to try and regain his father’s kingdom of Pontus. Suetonius, writing in c110A.D. says that Caesar “vanquished him in a single battle within five days after his arrival and four hours after getting sight of him” He later continues to describe Caesar’s triumphal return to Rome “In his Pontic triumph he displayed among the show-pieces of the procession an inscription of but three words, “I came, I saw, I conquered,” [ ‘Veni, vidi, vici’] not indicating the events of the war, as the others did, but the speed with which it was finished.” (Suetonius : De Vita Caesarum Divas Julius) This hopefully will lay to rest any lingering speculation regarding the origin of a very famous quotation.
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/asbook.html
by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton